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Abstract 
 
 The purpose of the study was to determine how the Fourth Amendment is treated 
in the age of the internet. To determine the degree of the significance of this relationship 
a comparative approach is used. Court opinions from cases involving other technological 
innovations and the Fourth Amendment were examined and their reasoning was 
compared to that of cases involving the internet and the Fourth Amendment. The results 
indicated that contrary to some fears that the internet would require a different approach 
with respect to the law it actually did not present many novel barriers to its application. 
The principle conclusion was that the reasoning used in cases involving older 
technologies, namely the test outlined in Katz v. United States, was consistently applied 
even in the age of the internet. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review  
 The invention and subsequent proliferation of the internet has impacted not just 
our society but others around the world. With such a large sphere of influence it could 
therefore be expected that there are instances in which people‘s actions in cyberspace 
may come in conflict with the law. This type of conflict will be at issue in this work, yet 
it will be more narrowly approached. The question posed here relates to the relationship 
between the law and the internet. There are many potential approaches possible when one 
tries to examine this relationship. The one used here focuses on the manner in which U. 
S. courts treat Fourth Amendment issues on the internet. The relationship between the 
law and the internet is important to a degree extending beyond merely the Fourth 
Amendment because ultimately laws that concern the internet can alter the way in which 
individuals behave on it. 
  The internet is an arena where people partake in countless actions varying from 
personal to business-related. Therefore a law that is crafted in order to govern what may 
or may not be performed on the internet could have significant implications for many 
people. One extreme example may be that if a law were passed that made it legal for 
police to read a suspect‘s e-mails without a warrant, then such a law is likely to curb the 
amount of e-mailing many people do. The manner in which the law and the internet 
interact is therefore far from trivial when one realizes it could potentially shape people‘s 
behavior.  
 Given that the internet is such a large technological innovation the question may 
be raised whether courts can treat Fourth Amendment cases exactly as they do their real-
world counterparts, whether they adapt their interpretations of laws accordingly, or if 
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they interpret the relationship in a wholly new manner. From the findings obtained when 
examining this subset of the law a clearer understanding of the larger relationship 
between the law and the internet could then be formed. Lessig more generally approaches 
this question, asking ―should this new space, cyberspace, be regulated by analogy to the 
regulation of other space, not quite cyber, or should we give up analogy and start anew‖ 
(1995, 1743)? Furthermore Lessig questions whether there is anything truly new about 
cyberspace; ―is there really a form of life here that we haven‘t known before, or is 
cyberspace just an electronic version of ordinary space, where the electronics might add 
something, but not really very much (1995, 1743)? Examining how Fourth Amendment 
cases are treated on the internet could then help in more concretely answering these 
questions. 
 The basis for the inquiry outlined above is grounded in past technological 
advances and the manner in which the courts have responded to Fourth Amendment 
issues related to them. Aerial surveillance, beepers, wire taps, and thermal imagers are 
examples of technological advancements that have had run-ins with the Fourth 
Amendment. The common law system under which the U. S. operates as well as the 
principle of stare decisis would imply that past cases concerning the same subject are 
expected to be resolved similarly, or at least using similar reasoning. These two 
principles combined with the observation that Fourth Amendment cases have been 
decided based on the same principles even when they concerned different technological 
innovations would further strengthen the path taken here. To support the observation 
noted above it should be mentioned that, taken as a whole, the manner in which courts 
have interpreted the Fourth Amendment vis-à-vis these technologies has been grounded 
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in the same fundamental principles, these being those derived from Justice Harlan‘s 
concurring opinion in Katz v. United States. Justice Harlan‘s concurring opinion in Katz 
has become the standard by which unreasonable searches and seizures are judged.  This 
―reasonable expectation of privacy‖ test was later more clearly stated in Smith v. 
Maryland as a test with two steps:  
The first is whether the individual, by his conduct, has ‗exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy,‘ whether, in the words of the Katz 
majority, the individual has shown that ‗he seeks to preserve [something] 
as private.‘ The second question is whether the individual's subjective 
expectation of privacy is ‗one that society is prepared to recognize as 
`reasonable,'‘ whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the individual's 
expectation, viewed objectively, is "justifiable" under the circumstances. 
(Smith v. U.S., 1979) 
Both Katz and Smith dealt with Fourth Amendment issues raised due to technological 
advances. Katz dealt with an electronic eavesdropping device and Smith dealt with a pen 
register, which is a device that records the numbers that are called from a phone line. 
Other cases that followed the test outlined in Katz and involved other forms of 
technology are United States v. Karo and United States v. Knotts, both of which dealt 
with monitoring an individual via an electronic beeper. Given that Fourth Amendment 
questions about these past technological innovations were addressed by looking to the 
same fundamental principles, if cases concerning the internet are interpreted differently 
by the courts then this could indicate that cyberspace is a truly unique environment in 
need of a wholly new approach with respect to the law, although this may be an extreme 
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scenario. On the other hand to find that the Fourth Amendment questions examined her 
are treated much as they were before this would at the very least show that some portions 
of real-world law may be more easily applicable to the cyber-world. 
 To further emphasize the potential import of the question posed here it would 
perhaps help to frame the issue within the context of the schools of thought that see 
cyberspace as being amenable to the law on the one hand and those that do not feel that 
the law can be applied so easily to the internet on the other. Goldsmith (1998), for 
example, is one of the scholars that focus on the question of whether or not cyberspace is 
able to be regulated at all. He points out that there are many skeptics doubting the 
possibility of there being a positive relationship between the law and cyberspace, noting 
that such skeptics may claim that ―cyberspace is so different from other communication 
media that it will, or should, resist all governmental regulation‖ (1998, 1201). To find 
that the relationship between cyberspace and the Fourth Amendment is comparable to 
other past technological innovations would then not only complement Goldsmith‘s claim 
that ―regulation of cyberspace is feasible and legitimate from the perspective of 
jurisdiction and choice of law‖ but it may also undermine to a degree some of the 
skeptic‘s notions of cyberspace (1998, 1201).  
 Lawrence Lessig also speaks to the issue of the viability of there being laws in 
cyberspace. Lessig (1999) disagrees with the skeptics that question whether the internet is 
amenable to regulation at all. His approach to the issue is a structural one, noting that 
some skeptics‘ opinions of cyberspace are that ―the nature of the space makes behavior 
there unregulable‖ (Lessig 1999, 505). He disagrees, however, because such a view relies 
   5 
on the assumption that cyberspace cannot adapt. Instead Lessig claims about cyberspace 
that: 
Its architecture is a function of its design -- or … its code. This code can 
change, either because it evolves in a different way, or because 
government or business pushes it to evolve in a particular way. And while 
particular versions of cyberspace do resist effective regulation, it does not 
follow that every version of cyberspace does so as well. Or alternatively, 
there are versions of cyberspace where behavior can be regulated, and the 
government can take steps to increase this regulability. (1999, 506) 
Once again delving into the relationship between the Fourth Amendment and the internet 
may shed light into how the law functions within this structure of cyberspace. To find 
that Fourth Amendment cases online are treated much like other Fourth Amendment 
cases fits into this more general debate between those in favor and those opposed to 
regulation given that it shows that the gap between the real-world and the cyber-world 
can indeed be bridged. From a strict adherence to past reasoning, to starting anew, or 
some middle ground,  the manner in which courts treat these cases could shape, or be 
shaped by, the development of this relationship. In this sense the manner in which the 
courts treat the relationship between the Fourth Amendment and the internet could impact 
what ―version of cyberspace,‖ as Lessig puts it, is in effect. Such an inquiry is beyond the 
scope discussed here but could be a potential area of further research. 
As mentioned, however, there are also those that do not so readily accept the 
possibility that the internet is as easy to regulate as some may think. Johnson and Post 
(1996), for example, base the crux of their argument against regulation of the internet on 
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the notion of territorial borders. Johnson and Post appeal to the connections between the 
real-world and the cyber-world to support their claims. They use the differences between 
the two worlds as being the reason why the law is not as readily amenable to cyberspace. 
It is fairly obvious that in the real world ―territorial borders, generally speaking, delineate 
areas within which different sets of legal rules apply‖ (Johnson and Post 1996, 1367). 
The problem with applying real-world laws to the internet should then be readily evident, 
namely ―cyberspace has no territorially based boundaries, because the cost and speed of 
message transmission on the Net is almost entirely independent of physical location‖ 
(Johnson and Post 1996, 1370). For Johnson and Post the attempts by governments to 
then try to regulate actions on the internet is a futile endeavor to undertake given that ―the 
volume of electronic communications crossing territorial boundaries is just too great in 
relation to the resources available to government authorities‖ ( 1996, 1372). Furthermore 
they claim that even an attempt to create borders in cyberspace may be nearly impossible 
―because the Net is engineered to work on the basis of ‗logical,‘ not geographical, 
locations, any attempt to defeat the independence of messages from physical locations 
would be as futile as an effort to tie an atom and a bit together‖ (Johnson and Post 1996, 
1374). This type of argument is precisely the kind that Lessig (1999) addressed when he 
argued against the skeptics.  
While Johnson and Post do not believe that real-world laws can be readily 
transplanted to cyberspace they still recognize that there is a necessity for a system to 
address legal issues arising in cyberspace. Their solution to the problem, however, is 
based on ―conceiving of Cyberspace as a distinct ‗place‘ for purposes of legal analysis by 
recognizing a legally significant border between Cyberspace and the ‗real world‘‖ (1996, 
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1378). Under this conceptualization by considering cyberspace as a homogenous space 
within the law then the problems raised by real-world borders fall by the wayside.  
Bomse (2001) also notes that the structure of the internet is perhaps the prime 
argument made by those that oppose regulations but beyond this there are other reasons. 
Another argument that is made against internet regulation is based on the perception that 
government is ―antithetical to the rapidly changing, highly versatile character of the 
computer industry‖ (Bomse 2001, 1727). Furthermore, even if government has the best of 
intentions with respect to regulating the internet, it functions much too slowly when 
compared to the rate at which the internet evolves (Bomse 2001, 1728). If these claims 
are true then any laws applied to the internet by the government may indeed be 
detrimental given that they would be outdated by the time they went into force. These 
alternate claims made against regulation that Bomse states could also be addressed by 
examining the way in which courts treat Fourth Amendment issues on the internet. The 
ease with which courts arrive at their rulings as well as the rulings themselves could 
indicate the responsiveness of the government to the quickly changing world of 
cyberspace. 
 There are others that are not as skeptical when it comes to the possibility of 
applying the law to the internet, instead they emphasize what may be important is the 
approach taken when attempting to do so. This does not mean, however, that they may 
feel old laws are directly applicable to the internet. Kerr acknowledges that there are 
scholars that ―believe that the field of Internet law offers nothing new,‖ to them 
―applying law to the Internet is like applying law to any new set of facts: draw analogies 
and then apply existing law‖ (2003, 380). For Kerr the statements made by those skeptics 
   8 
of internet law, or ―cyberlaw‖ as he calls it, are not as easily applied as they may think 
given that the proper analogies would depend on the particular perspective that is 
adopted. Neither does he wholly agree with those that support the idea of cyberlaw given 
that he does not think a complete change is needed when approaching law in cyberspace, 
it is mainly the way in which the facts are approached that needs to be addressed.  
Kerr frames the problems related to applying the law to the internet as stemming 
from determining what the ―facts‖ are. He views the answer to this problem as taking one 
of two forms: 
We can model the Internet's facts based on virtual reality, looking from the 
perspective of an Internet user who perceives the virtual world of 
cyberspace and analogizes Internet transactions to their equivalent in the 
physical world. Alternatively, we can model the facts based on the 
physical reality of how the network operates. From this perspective, 
Internet transactions can be understood based on how the network actually 
works "behind the scenes," regardless of the perceptions of a user. (Kerr 
2003, 357) 
To be able to apply the law to the internet it must be determined which of these 
perspectives to adopt. Kerr labels the perspective that bases facts on virtual reality the 
―internal perspective,‖ and the perspective based on real-world facts the ―external 
perspective.‖ The perspective chosen is important, Kerr claims, because it can influence 
how law shapes out on the internet given that ―in a surprising number of situations, we 
arrive at one result when applying law from and internal perspective and a different result 
when applying law from an external perspective‖ (2003, 357). The reason behind these 
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varying outcomes according to Kerr is that each perspective is bundled with its own set 
of facts and ―legal outcomes depend on facts, and the facts of the Internet depend on 
which perspective we choose‖ (2003, 361). Furthermore Kerr argues that each set of facts 
do not necessarily have to correlate. Changes one may experience in one realm are not 
necessarily reflected in the other. A change in code may drastically impact a person‘s 
online experience but a physical change, for instance relating to wiring by an ISP, may go 
completely unnoticed by the user. Therefore, given that the two sets of facts need not 
coincide ―every time we apply law to the internet, we will have two possible outcomes: 
an internal outcome and an external outcome‖ (Kerr 2003, 362).  
 Kerr illustrates the potential impact these different perspectives may have by 
presenting the approaches two officers may take with respect to email. He argues that one 
officer, viewing email from the internal perspective, will see an email sent from one 
person to another as a virtual manifestation of physical mail. This officer would conclude 
that to access email would require a warrant according to the Fourth Amendment. A 
second officer, looking at the situation externally, would arrive at a different conclusion. 
The second officer would merely view the transmission of the email as a message relayed 
first to the user‘s ISP who copies the message and then sends it to the recipients‘ ISP, if 
they do not share the same ISP, who would then in turn send the recipient a copy of the 
message when the recipient requests it by clicking an icon on their computer. This officer 
would view the email as a message that has been transmitted to several parties, requiring 
only a subpoena to retrieve it from one of the intermediaries and not a search warrant 
(Kerr 2003, 365-366).  
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 Ultimately Kerr does not venture a guess as to which perspective should 
dominate, claiming that ―perhaps one of these influences will overpower the other, 
establishing a more internal or external approach over time‖ or alternately ―perhaps an 
equilibrium will be reached, and both perspectives will survive and continue to shape the 
law of the Internet in the future‖ (2003, 405). His view stands in between the extremes 
consisting of those who claim that the law cannot be applied to the internet on one end 
and those that argue it can be applied without any special attention on the other. For Kerr 
the old laws can be applied, but there may be some form of adaptation that needs to take 
place in order for this to occur. 
 In a later article Kerr notes the persistence of the problem of adapting old laws to 
the internet and focuses more closely on the Fourth Amendment. Kerr notes that ―a few 
scholars have pointed out that the application of the Fourth Amendment to computer 
networks will require considerable rethinking of preexisting law, but none have sketched 
out what that rethinking might be‖ (2010, 1006-1007).  He also reiterates that ―the 
differences between the facts of physical space and the facts of the Internet require courts 
to identify new Fourth Amendment distinctions to maintain the function of Fourth 
Amendment rules in an online environment‖ (Kerr 2010, 1007). Both of these claims 
highlight how Kerr does feel that while previous laws can be applied to the internet, they 
must first undergo some changes. Though one may at first think this would require 
fundamental changes to how courts treat Fourth Amendment issues online, Kerr 
recommends that ―courts should try to apply the Fourth Amendment in the new 
environment in ways that roughly replicate the role of the Fourth Amendment in the 
traditional physical setting‖ (2010, 1007). This view then does not go so far as the one 
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calling for a complete reconceptualization of how the law is meant to function with 
respect to the internet.  
 Kerr argues for some smaller scale adaptation of the law, however. He claims that 
such a new approach is needed given that ―as technology advances, legal rules designed 
for one state of technology begin to take on unintended consequences‖ and ―if 
technological change results in an entirely new technological environment, the old rules 
no longer serve the same function‖ (Kerr 2010, 1009). The new rules in turn are not 
meant to create more change, however, they are rather meant to allow the older rules to 
function once again in the new environment. Kerr‘s overall view of the Fourth 
Amendment with respect to the internet is that it ―will have to adopt new principles to 
maintain its longstanding function‖ but ―the need for evolution is nothing new: the Fourth 
Amendment will adapt to how wrongdoers use the Internet just as it adapted to how 
wrongdoers started using postal letters, automobiles, and the telephone‖ (2010, 1048). 
What is important for Kerr is to develop a way to be able to bridge the old laws to the 
new environment. 
 By clearly identifying adequate links between the real world and the cyber world 
Kerr argues that ―the Fourth Amendment will remain technology-neutral in the sense that 
the overall amount and function of Fourth Amendment protection will be roughly the 
same regardless of whether a wrongdoer commits his crime entirely online, entirely in the 
physical world, or using a mix of the two‖ (2010, 1015-1016). Through recognizing that 
the two environments are distinct but then trying to create adequate links between them 
Kerr believes that the more fundamental goals of the Fourth Amendment will adapt in the 
face of new technologies.  
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 As in his previous work Kerr emphasizes how facts are important when it comes 
to the relationship between the Fourth Amendment and the internet but this time around 
he goes further and argues how facts can help to bridge the gap between these two. He 
focuses on the inside/outside distinction in the physical world, claiming that it serves to 
―distinguish between what the police can do without cause and what they need cause to 
do‖ (Kerr 2010, 1009). Yet noting that there is no inside/outside that is readily 
identifiable online Kerr asks ―what rule or standard in the online setting can server the 
same basic function that is served by the inside/outside distinction in the physical world‖ 
(2010, 1018)? The answer to this question according to Kerr is to relate inside/outside 
surveillance to content/non-content surveillance online. The reason given for this is that 
when police watch someone outside they can gather information such as where they 
were, what they were doing, or where they were going at a particular time. Inside 
surveillance would consist of breaking into a person‘s private space which would lead to 
the gathering of more personal and private information. Similarly, Kerr suggests that 
―online, non-content surveillance is usually surveillance related to identity, location, and 
time; content surveillance is surveillance of private thought and speech‖ (2010, 1018). By 
examining the reasoning that courts use with respect to Fourth Amendment cases 
involving the internet it could potentially be observed whether courts have put the kind of 
comparisons Kerr points out between the real and online worlds in effect, which would in 
turn be indicative of some degree of adaptation of the Fourth Amendment in the face of 
the internet. 
 Kerr is not alone in arguing that a distinction must be made between the physical 
and digital worlds when applying older laws to the internet. Tyson (2010) also argues that 
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―courts should more closely scrutinize the distinction between the content and non-
content portions of an internet communication rather than rely on antiquated doctrines 
that do not adequately address all of the possible privacy concerns‖ (2010, 1261). 
Tyson‘s approach to the problems arising from the interaction between the internet and 
the Fourth Amendment revolves around statutory attempts taken to address them. The 
statute that Tyson focuses on is the Stored Communications Act. Tyson acknowledges 
that even a statutory approach may have its shortcomings, claiming that ―the SCA fails to 
adequately protect an Internet user‘s privacy because it lacks suitable guidance for the 
courts to follow when interpreting the statute‖ (2010, 1284). An example of this failing is 
that ―the SCA distinguishes between content and non-content in an Internet 
communication, but it does not provide the courts with clear guidance to determine the 
difference between content and non-content in light of changing technology‖ (Tyson 
2010, 1284). Furthermore while some have argued that courts work too slowly to keep up 
with technology Tyson suggests that statutes may also not adapt as quickly as one may 
expect, claiming that ―Congress has not updated the SCA quickly enough to reflect 
modern Internet use, and thus, the SCA has failed to keep pace with the rapid 
development of Internet communications‖ (2010, 1285). Ultimately Tyson favors a 
judicial rather than statutory approach in order to better address the friction that may arise 
between the Fourth Amendment and the internet, mainly because ―the SCA does not 
provide a suitable substitute for Fourth Amendment protections because modern Internet 
use has outgrown the SCA‘s useful application‖ (2010, 1298). Yet she argues that courts 
cannot merely proceed as they have if the best outcome is to be attained, rather ―courts 
should recognize that the first generation of Internet privacy decisions relied on 
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antiquated doctrines and that these decisions might not help a modern court resolve 
privacy questions‖ (2010, 1298). 
 Grubins (2008), similarly to Tyson and Kerr, believes there is potential for the 
law to be applied to the internet but in order to best do so it must be adapted in some 
manner. Furthermore, similarly to Tyson, Grubins questions which approach may be best 
for dealing with the issues that may arise when the internet comes into conflict with the 
Fourth Amendment; legislative, judicial, or a mix of the two? Of the statutory attempts 
made to protect privacy Grubins claims that what they actually protect is rather narrowly 
defined and that ―these limited provisions do not address the broad, ongoing changes in 
communications technologies‖ (2008, 741). Grubins also points to Voice over Internet 
Protocol (VoIP) technology to demonstrate how statutes may be detrimental to privacy. 
While a VoIP call is overall very similar to a regular phone call Grubins argues that given 
the way it functions mechanically it may fall under the purview of either the Stored 
Communication Act or the Wiretap Act, which would offer different degrees of 
protection. This type of argument could be seen as another example to the idea Kerr 
(2003) posited regarding internal and external perspectives, demonstrating how both 
courts and Congress may grapple with similar issues when trying to apply the law to the 
internet. Grubins then weights the benefits and consequences these two bodies hold when 
it comes to dealing with the issue of the law on the internet. 
 Grubins notes that ―the fast pace of technological development might appear to 
favor legislative leadership‖ given that ―in theory, legislatures are able to respond quickly 
to changes in technology by updating legislation regularly‖ (2008, 744). Yet, similarly to 
Tyson, Grubins claims that even though Congress may appear to have the capacity to 
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deal with these issues it ―does not always amend the statutory framework to keep up with 
changes in technology, which can lead to outdates laws and insufficient protection‖ 
(2010,744). Another claim often made to support the statutory approach to dealing with 
internet and privacy issues is that Congress has the benefit of holding committee 
meetings wherein they can be better informed by experts to potentially choose the best 
path to take when deciding the issues, yet Grubins counters that this means that Congress 
―is subject to political realities that do not always make it the best arbiter of constitutional 
provisions; it may not be able to give equal weight and consideration to all interests‖ 
(2010, 745). Similarly along this line of reasoning is the claim that ―Congress is also 
easily swayed by public opinion‖ meaning that ―such a system responds well to the 
wishes of the majority, but public fear and outcry can lead to laws that do not give 
sufficient weight to constitutional concerns or protect all interests‖ (Grubins 2010, 746). 
While there are also those that argue against an overly active court Grubins claims that 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ―supports a judicial system that actively reinterprets 
and applies Fourth Amendment privacy protection as new technologies develop‖ (2010, 
748). Furthermore Grubins notes that an added benefit to the judicial approach when 
compared to the legislative one is that ―legislatures act without regard to constitutional 
requirements and the freedom from government intrusion, so highly valued by the 
Constitution‘s framers, can be easily eroded‖ (2010, 748). Ultimately Grubins‘ favored 
approach is for a combination of both approaches. Courts can lay the baseline privacy 
expectations that may come along with technological innovations, but ―no court decision 
would be able to address all factual scenarios, so congressional refinements would be 
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necessary‖ (2010, 751). The congressional refinements would be added with the 
knowledge that courts place a strong premium on the privacy in the new technologies. 
Leary (2011) questions the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to new 
technologies as well. Though her approach is narrowly focused, in that it questions how 
the Fourth Amendment and technology impact society‘s youth, she raises a larger issue 
that may be made about the expectation of privacy present in this day and age. Leary 
points to the test established in Katz in order to demonstrate how it could potentially 
create problems with respect to today‘s youth. The reason behind this problem derives 
from the notion that youth and other ―digital natives‖ often ―engage in somewhat risky 
behavior online and have a false perception of privacy‖ (Leary 2011, 1071). As a result 
of this naïveté these individuals ―may not manifest a subjective expectation of privacy 
similar to adults‖ (Leary 2011, 1071). In this sense then the Katz test would be 
potentially unfairly applied to an entire class of society. Leary‘s fundamental question is 
that ―given that many youths arguably seem to act differently about traditionally privacy 
online, how can the law plausibly rule that they nevertheless have a reasonable 
expectation of it‖ (2011, 1072)? The problem stems from the tendency of youths to all 
too readily through conditioning share their private information online; to them it is the 
natural order (Leary 2011, 1089-1090). So if a young person was somehow able to 
establish a subjective expectation of privacy, with respect to the objective prong of the 
Katz test the question of who is used as the norm becomes important, what may seem 
reasonable to the youth would perhaps be not as reasonable to the rest of society who 
may be more reticent to reveal information as freely online. When viewed from the 
perspective of the debate between the ability or lack thereof to apply the law to the 
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internet Leary‘s work would fall somewhere in between  the two extremes. On the one 
hand she does not completely doubt that the law, in this case the Fourth Amendment 
specifically, can be applied online. Yet she warns that it can potentially be applied 
unfairly and may therefore need to be adapted in order to remedy this problem. 
 The difficulty outlined by Leary (2011) with applying the Fourth 
Amendment to new technologies is expanded upon by Plourde-Cole (2010). Plourde-
Cole points out that with respect to the Katz test ―the second prong‘s supposedly 
objectively inquiry – the question of whether society ‗recognizes‘ as reasonable a certain 
privacy right - is one that is objectively unanswerable by judges, philosophers, or even 
sociologists‖ (2010, 580-581). Plourde-Cole goes beyond arguing that the Katz test may 
not be readily applicable to the youth, as Leary does, and questions whether it can be 
accurately applied at all. Furthermore she notes that ―the challenge of discerning an 
‗objective‘ standard for whether a privacy expectation is reasonable is exacerbated by the 
rapid evolution of technology, where expectations are neither static nor easily 
discernable‖ (Plourde-Cole 2010, 581). In this sense it appears as if Plourde-Cole favors 
the adoption of wholly new principles in order to best apply the law to the internet, at 
least to the degree that the Fourth Amendment is concerned. 
Orso (2010) and Engel (2010) both build upon the extant difficulties in the 
relationship between the internet and the law, emphasizing the import of addressing these 
issues. Both of these scholars‘ works take the problems presented between the internet 
and the Fourth Amendment and go beyond merely examining the internet on computers 
to include the problems posed by the internet on smartphones. The internet and cellular 
phones are still relatively new innovations whose relationships with respect to the law are 
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still far from fully defined. As the previously mentioned authors have made clear the 
relationship between the internet and the law can be troublesome. Smartphones further 
complicate this situation given that they combine these two innovations and bring about 
even more questions that need to be addressed. 
With respect to computers Orso notes that ―there is a dearth of search incident to 
arrest jurisprudence regarding laptops or personal computers‖ (2010, 224). This lack of a 
reference point complicates the situation with smartphones since although they are 
phones as their name implies they can perform many of the same functions that a 
computer can. Therefore one may question if these phones may instead be evaluated 
according to jurisprudence related to phones. Orso notes that contrary to what one may 
assume with respect to cellular phones ―federal courts have validated warrantless 
searches of cellular phones, usually relying on one of two exceptions to the warrant 
requirement – exigent circumstances and search incident to arrest‖ (2010, 196). The 
potential problem with using this approach should be readily evident. The amount of 
information a smart phone can contain far exceeds that which a conventional cellular 
phone can hold. Today‘s cellular phones are even more powerful and have greater 
potential than older computers.  
Orso questions whether courts should allow officers to continue searching phones 
incident to arrest as some courts have found to be permissible given that they have 
―generally reasoned that a cellular phone differs little from a basic pager, address book, 
or cigarette box, all which may be lawfully searched incident to a suspect‘s arrest‖ (2010, 
201). To adopt this stance with respect to smart phones would ―subject anyone who is the 
subject of a custodial arrest, even for a traffic violation, to a pre-approved foray into a 
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virtual warehouse of their most intimate communications and photographs without 
probable cause‖ (Orso 2010, 211). Based on the few cases involving laptop and computer 
searches incident to arrest as well as the similarity that smartphones have with laptops 
Orso reasons that ―if it is true that laptops and other computers are not searchable 
incident to arrest, then it necessarily follows that neither are smart phones (or at least they 
should not be)‖ (2010, 219). Orso‘s proposed solution is then to differentiate between the 
type of cellular phones in question and to apply different standards when determining 
whether a search incident to arrested is allowed for each.  
Engel‘s works supports Orso‘s to a great extent. He too notes that the majority of 
lower courts have ―concluded that the content of cell phones may be searched incident to 
arrest without limitation‖ (Engel 2010, 253). He further points out that newer model 
cellular phones record incoming and outgoing calls, and can also contain address books, 
calendars, voice and text messages, email, video and pictures‖ (Engel 2010, 257). With 
respect to searches incident to arrest  Engle notes that ―the ability of electronic devices to 
store information is changing rapidly, and it is foolish consistency to continue to try to 
place the square pegs of electronic devices in the round hole of the container doctrine‖ 
(2010, 292).  He cautions, however, that such a claim is not meant to ―suggest that the 
entire search incident to arrest doctrine should be abandoned or even re-examined‖ 
(Engle 2010, 292). Engle too finds the more appropriate solutions would be to merely 
differentiate between the types of devices that would fall under already existing 
standards. Engle and Orso‘s works further emphasizes the import of more clearly 
defining the relationship between the law and the internet since the outcome in this 
relationship could impact future technological innovations. 
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The ever-evolving changes in technology, of which Orso and Engle used smart 
phones as an example, and the problems it may pose on the Fourth Amendment is 
expanded upon by Strandburg (2011). The growth of social media and cloud computing, 
Strandburg posits, ―will make it impossible to preserve the privacy even of traditional 
Fourth Amendment bastions, such as the home, without considering the intertwined 
effects of technological and social change‖ (2011, 106). The argument she presents runs 
counter to those that may think that the internet is its own space. On the contrary, she 
claims, the internet has advanced to a point where past Fourth Amendment rulings ―will 
be insufficient if we hope to extend meaningful Fourth Amendment protection into a 
networked world in which technology and social behavior are co-evolving‖ (Strandburg 
2011, 108).  
A large concern that Strandburg has about the future of the Fourth Amendment in 
the new technological realm lies in the reliance on the third party doctrine upon which 
previous Fourth Amendment cases such as Miller and Smith have relied. The third party 
doctrine ―in which every activity involving a digital intermediary is open to law 
enforcement scrutiny (at least as far as the Constitution is concerned)‖ will become more 
troublesome with respect to Fourth Amendment protection ―in the whole range of social 
contexts making up the integrated online-offline world‖ (Strandburg 2011, 127-128). As 
cloud computing gains popularity and more and more people store personal information 
online these actions will raise questions such as whether the service providers that store 
this information count as third parties that may be approached by officials and asked for 
information. 
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The solution that Strandburg proposes for the potential Fourth Amendment 
questions that may arise from the increasingly intertwined relationship people may have 
with the internet is not to create a wholly new standard, however, but rather to extend 
upon previous Fourth Amendment standards. More specifically she links the new 
innovations to physical ones, nothing that ―just like hotel and guest rooms, cloud 
computing arrangements and social media of various kinds share many (but not all) of the 
attributes that motivate strong Fourth Amendment protection of the home and office‖ 
(Strandburg 2011, 145).  Strandburg considers that ―these technologies are potentially the 
technosocial extension of our homes and offices and, like hotel rooms and curtilages, 
need Fourth Amendment protection‖ (2011, 145). Yet Strandburg, as other scholars have 
noted, identifies the difficulty of addressing these issues nothing that ―while courts are 
still grappling with text messaging and e-mail, society has moved on, integrating the web 
more and more seamlessly into the social realm and providing virtual extension of the 
home, the office, and other core loci of private life‖ (2011, 164). Strandburg‘s work can 
ultimately be said to stand somewhere in the middle of the internet regulability debate. 
On the one hand it seems she does not feel all old Fourth Amendment principles are 
amenable to the internet as it evolves, as is evident from her suggestion to place less 
emphasis on the third party principle. On the other hand she acknowledges the new areas 
created by these new internet technologies do require Fourth Amendment protection and 
the manner in which she proposes that this be accomplished is by granting them similar 
protection to physical locations, such as hotel and guest rooms. 
The question then being posed here, asking how the Fourth Amendment is 
interacting with the internet may then offer some insight in the debate between those that 
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favor regulation of cyberspace and those that are wary of the ability to easily do so. It 
may also reveal how courts are reacting to the problems that many of the authors noted 
above have observed such as the adequacy of applying real world traits to cyberspace. 
Though any findings presented here will far from settle this debate they may nevertheless 
clarify the issue. Constancy in the manner in which courts treat Fourth Amendment issues 
even in the wildly new frontier of the internet would bolster the case for those favoring 
regulation given that such a finding may indicate the structural barriers posed by the 
internet are not as unassailable as the skeptics may claim. On the other hand, finding 
inconsistent rulings may reveal that the law on the internet is more mercurial than some 
may expect, and may indeed pose an obstacle for regulation and a new conceptualization 
of the relationship between the law and cyberspace may be needed. 
 Given that at issue here is how courts treat Fourth Amendment questions 
involving the internet the most evident approach is to examine relevant cases from 
appellate courts, with Supreme Court cases being the most preferable, in which Fourth 
Amendment violations committed online in some form are called into question in 
prosecutions. By examining the reasoning given in the opinions of these cases it can be 
determined if courts remain loyal to the guidelines that resulted from Katz. Ultimately the 
nature of the crime itself is not wholly relevant given that the main concern is whether 
courts exhibit a consistency of reasoning not just among cyberspace cases but also with 
older cases involving other technological innovations. Undoubtedly, however, cases with 
real-world analogues may be particularly useful in tracing the similarity of reasoning, or 
lack thereof. It would then be preferable to consider cases wherein the expectation 
privacy of an individual online is called into question. Warshak v. United States would be 
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an example of a suitable case to study for the purposes presented here. The case calls into 
question whether the police violated an individual‘s Fourth Amendment rights when they 
made his Internet Service Provider hand over his e-mail without a search warrant. Such a 
case would directly address the type of problem Kerr (2003) with respect to internal or 
external perspectives taken by the court.  
 Cases such as Warshak would need to have their reasoning scrutinized and 
compared to past high profile Fourth Amendment cases involving other forms of 
technological innovations, such as Smith as noted above, to determine if the fundamental 
lines of reasoning between the various chosen cases remain consistent. A secondary aim 
when considering cases may also specifically address the type of complaint that Bomse 
described relating to the adaptability of the law to the internet. This phenomenon may be 
examined by following a case along the appeals process and determining if some reaction 
to a cyber-related evolution altered the reasoning process between the different courts. 
Such an analysis would be secondary to the main goal, however. 
 To support the methodological approach outlined above it may help noting other 
articles that draw parallels between cyber-world and real-world acts. In ―Keeping Secrets 
in Cyberspace: Establishing Fourth Amendment Protection for Internet Communication‖ 
(1997), parallels are drawn indicating how acts on the internet can be seen as analogues 
of real-world cases where the Fourth Amendment may come into play. E-mail, for 
example, can be seen as analogous to traditional mail or even communication via the 
telephone, which is an act that was directly addressed under the Fourth Amendment in 
Olmstead v. United States (Anon. 1997, 1597-1598). If a case were to arise that were 
comparable to Olmstead but set in cyberspace, one may then expect a similar decision. 
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Yet, as will be noted, even if similar cases have different outcomes it may not necessarily 
be true that the reason behind it is due to an evaluation on fundamentally different 
principles. 
 In ―The Developments in the Law: The Law of Cyberspace,‖ (1999) it is noted 
that a similar approach has been undertaken to examine the relationship between the law 
and the internet. The article cites a case wherein plaintiffs were awarded damages by a 
federal jury over a speech related matter on the internet even though a federal judge had 
previously enjoined the enforcement of a law that would have restricted the type of 
speech in question (Anon. 1999, 1582). From this case the author suggests that perhaps 
―the bounds of permissible regulation of Internet speech derive directly from established, 
real-space First Amendment jurisprudence, under which governmental attempts to 
regulate speech content are normally subject to strict scrutiny‖ yet those that still feel 
they have been wronged may ―pursue each other in actions for libel, defamation, and 
death threats‖ (Anon. 1999, 1582). The on-line case then seems to parallel a real-world 
scenario where it may be very difficult to stop certain forms of speech, yet people still 
have a recourse if they feel aggrieved. To find a relationship such as this, but relating to 
the Fourth Amendment, wherein real-world principles carry on to the Internet would then 
further bolster the claim made in this article. This article also alludes to the larger reach 
that the relationship between the law and the internet may have on other individuals, 
noting about legal rules that ―not only will these rules affect people‘s cyber-lives, but 
because cyberspace life is becoming more entwined with real-space life, the rules 
governing virtual communities will also influence our real-space communities‖ (Anon. 
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1999, 1587). Such a claim once again emphasizes the potential impact the relationship 
between the law and the internet may have. 
 The parallel between the real world and cyberspace is not absolute, however, 
given that ―exception for searches incident to a lawful arrest, necessary to protect life, in 
hot pursuit, under exigent circumstances, and at the U.S. border will rarely be relevant to 
investigations of cyber-communications‖ (Anon. 1997, 1599-1600). But as scholars such 
as Orso (2010) and Engel (2010) have noted above even this line has become more 
blurred with the advent of smartphones. Yet there still remain other exceptions that may 
still come into play such as ―when consent to search has been given, when the 
information has been disclosed to a third party, and when the information is in plain view 
of an officer‖ ( Anon. 1997, 1600). This comparability illustrates that the potential for 
conflict between the Fourth Amendment and the internet is rather large. Taking e-mail 
alone for example once again, someone may believe their e-mails are to remain private if 
they were to be transmitting questionable material but a systems administrator may notice 
the interaction and alert authorities. In the internet there are many third parties such as a 
systems administrators, service providers, or even hackers that could come across 
information one expects to be private and then make it public, meaning there are 
potentially many points of friction between the Fourth Amendment and the internet. 
 As touched upon briefly before, caution must be used when examining the 
reasoning behind relevant cases, though, even if the facts of the cases appear to be similar 
to their real-world equivalents. This is the case because even in past Fourth Amendment 
cases that appeared to have been similar different courts arrived at different opinions. 
This does not mean that one court followed the Katz standard while another disregarded it 
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either partially or completely, however. On the contrary, in cases such as these all courts 
in question will likely claim that they remained loyal to Katz. The differences between 
the decisions in these instances lies in the particular details each court chose to emphasize 
in each. It is therefore possible for similar cases to arrive at different conclusions, yet still 
follow the same fundamental framework. Therefore the cases used to evaluate the 
relationship at issue here cannot have the reasoning scrutinized too harshly against 
previous cases. If a pair internet related cases, for example, were both relatively 
analogous to a real-world case yet courts rule in opposite ways for each this does not 
necessarily invalidate the cases from consideration, the difference in decision would 
instead simply have to be justified by the slight differences in reasoning used by each 
court. It is the fundamental principles behind the reasoning that are most poignant.   
 The type of situation alluded to above is addressed by Sergent (1995) and his 
work emphasizes the idea that small factors could lead to differing opinions between 
similar cases. His work demonstrates that the methodological approach taken here does 
not need to have perfect correspondence between real-world and cyber-world cases. 
Sergent outlines the problems that have arisen from the relatively subjective test that 
resulted from Justice Harlan‘s Katz concurrence and considers how these problems may 
affect computer networks. He delves deeper into one aspect of the Katz test, this being 
the expectation of privacy, and illustrates how determining this key factor may vary 
greatly depending on ―ownership of the computer, ownership of the information 
involved, and control of or access to the computer and information‖ (1995, 1195). 
Sergent‘s observations emphasize that although the small idiosyncrasies of each case 
ultimately will not be the focal point of the case studies it may nevertheless be fruitful to 
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consider whether courts‘ decisions hinge on comparable points of contention as they did 
in the cases of previous technological innovations. To find that the same types of details 
are often critical in deciding these types of Fourth Amendment cases as were critical in 
previous ones, may strengthen the connection between the technologies even though on 
their face the cases may not seem all too comparable. Furthermore it should be noted that 
these types of subjective judgment calls exist even in old Fourth Amendment cases. 
 A hypothetical example regarding the difference between evaluating the 
reasoning versus the outcome of court decisions that is surely likely to have played out in 
the real world may revolve around the physical location of a criminal action. Two cases 
with otherwise very similar characteristics could nevertheless have potentially different 
outcomes merely because one defendant was working on their personal computer at home 
whereas another was working in an office they shared with other people on their 
company‘s computer. If a third party were to find questionable material they obtained 
from the internet on their computers then informed the police who proceeded to search 
their computers without a warrant then both courts could potentially apply the Katz test 
with varying outcomes. It could be argued that the person at home had a greater 
expectation of privacy and where the search would be invalid in that case it would still be 
valid in the case where the person‘s computer was in their workplace. Though these cases 
could end up with opposite decisions with respect to the warrantless searches the courts 
nevertheless applied the same fundamental principle. By inquiring about the reasoning 
used in cases rather than the actual outcomes one may therefore be able to ascertain more 
substantial results with respect to how courts are treating internet related cases. One 
judging merely based on the outcome may infer that courts are wildly inconsistent in how 
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they handle internet cases when in fact they may be using the same reasoning and are 
actually being very consistent in their approach. This example uses rather large 
differences between two cases but other cases could have an innumerable amount of 
minor details that could affect the outcome while the reasoning nevertheless remains the 
same. 
 Even if cases have highly varying outcomes they are still likely to be relevant for 
the purposes presented here. The extent to which courts remain faithful to the reasoning 
in previous cases dealing with other technological innovations and the Fourth 
Amendment could be interpreted as a matter of degree, from a strict adherence to the past 
to a large break with traditional reasoning. A result anywhere along this spectrum is 
likely to signify a different outcome in the relationship between the law and the internet. 
The implications of this work then, as has also been touched upon above, is therefore 
much larger in scope than the actual question at issue. 
 The subsequent chapters of this work will be organized with the methodology 
outlined next, followed by the results chapter, and then concluded with the discussion 
chapter. The methodology chapter will expand upon the basic outline presented above as 
well as address how cases will be selected. Furthermore this chapter will address 
potential benefits as well as problems that may arise from using a comparative approach. 
The findings chapter will consist of the court cases chosen for the inquest, and will 
outline the overall facts of the case.  The reasoning used in the courts‘ opinions will be 
examined for potential trends or other significant findings in their reasoning, such as the 
emergence of new principles on which internet cases are judged.  In the discussion 
section the greater significance of the findings will be examined. This final section will 
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also attempt to integrate the findings into the debate outlined above concerning the ability 
to regulate the internet.  
 The internet has truly been a revolutionary innovation that may have been hard to 
imagine merely decades ago. It is obvious, though, that courts have had to deal with large 
technological innovations before as well when they interacted somehow with the Fourth 
Amendment. The internet‘s impact on the lives of most people can make it arguably one 
of the larger technological innovations that the court has dealt with, however. It may be 
too bold a statement, though, to claim that the law must start from a clean slate when it is 
considered in the context of the internet. Similarly to claim that decades-old principles 
can be easily transplanted to function when considering legal issues online may be too 
simplistic a claim as well. The various cases that courts have previously considered are 
likely to serve as a more than adequate foundation when it comes to addressing at least 
some fundamental issues that come up when the internet and the Fourth Amendment 
come into contact. This relationship may then in turn help shed some light on the larger 
relationship between the law in general on the internet. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
 The issue to be addressed pertains to the way that U.S. courts have reacted to 
Fourth Amendment conflicts on the internet. This question is but a smaller subset of the 
much larger issue concerning the relationship between the law and its adaptability in the 
age of the internet.  The main goal of this inquiry is to determine whether courts have 
been consistent in regards to how they handle Fourth Amendment issues online when 
compared to how they have handled these issues when they involved other technological 
innovations. On the one hand it is possible that the internet is treated just as any other 
technological innovation has been treated and on the other it could be that it is such a 
different type of technological innovation that a wholly new point of view must be taken 
when dealing with the issues that arise with it. A third alternate outcome may even be 
that some half-way adaptation has occurred; building upon the old foundations that were 
used to deal with previous Fourth Amendment issues but also creating new principles to 
address internet-specific problems. The hope is that by looking into this issue a better 
understanding of the path that courts have taken in interpreting the Fourth Amendment  
with respect to the internet can be achieved and furthermore this knowledge may lend 
some insight into the relationship between the law and the internet in a more general 
sense.  
 A broad description of the methodological approach to be taken will first be 
outlined before then going into more detail with respect to the process. Afterwards 
potential difficulties that this approach may give rise to will be addressed. A general 
description of the particular methodology that will be used to address the issue in 
question is that it will be done comparatively. Cases that demonstrate the Fourth 
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Amendment clashing with some sort of technological innovation will be compared to 
Fourth amendment cases involving the internet. This comparison will be done by 
examining the reasoning between the various cases that are relevant to the issue and 
determining whether or not it is consistent as well as whether new principles have been 
adopted to deal with specific internet-related issues. 
 Having given a general overview of the methodology that will be used a more 
detailed view is now required. The facts of the cases that are chosen will presented and 
their opinions will be analyzed and their reasoning will be compared to that of relevant 
high profile cases that have dealt with the Fourth Amendment problems raised due to past 
technological innovations. The types of cases that are chosen need not be analogous to 
each other, on the contrary greater diversity between the kinds of cases could arguably 
yield more robust results. If the reasoning remains consistent between wildly varying 
cases, including those involving the internet, this would suggest that the internet may be 
amenable, at least to a degree, to previously established principles. 
 Gathering useable cases is a relatively simple process, seeing as the elements used 
for comparison will be actual court opinions. The availability of these sources should not 
be a large impediment; the more difficult part will be determining which cases are and 
are not relevant. The internet will itself be a valuable resource in gathering information 
given that many courts have their opinions digitized and made available online; more 
specifically the online database LexisNexis will likely be an unparalleled source for 
gathering actual case opinions.  Furthermore the more influential cases, such as Katz v. 
United States for example, are more likely to be readily accessible on the internet. 
Therefore finding the most influential cases involving technological innovations of all 
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sorts should not be as daunting a task as one may first expect. To only use the most 
widely known cases may yield a sample size that is too small and potentially biased given 
that their fame may be due to a controversial ruling based on reasoning most other courts 
would not have employed. So for gathering a larger number of relevant cases a brute-
force approach may be the tactic that reveals the largest amount of potential candidates. 
Such an approach would require searching for any cases involving internet related actions 
which would then be filtered based on the facts to reveal those that addressed Fourth 
Amendment issues. 
 The process for determining the potential pool for relevant cases relies on a few 
factors. The cases obviously need to raise a Fourth Amendment claim. To add some 
refinement to the potential pool of cases as well as more significant findings, given that 
their opinion carries more weight, district court opinions will be bypassed in favor of 
appellate court opinions. The pool of potential cases will be further refined given that 
several claims can be made with respect to the Fourth Amendment; such as questions 
about probable cause or questions regarding the scope or legitimacy of warrants. In order 
to be able to more readily isolate and compare reasoning patterns between cases it would 
then be more beneficial to focus on one particular Fourth Amendment issue raised in the 
chosen cases. For instance one would not expect to be able to compare reasoning between 
one case that questioned the presence of probable cause on the one hand and one arguing 
an overbroad warrant on the other. For this reason the cases examined here will include 
the question of whether a warrantless search was justified under the Fourth Amendment.  
 The cases found to be relevant to the issue at hand can then have their opinions 
scrutinized. The reasoning given for deciding the particular Fourth Amendment issue in 
   33 
question in each case can then be gauged against previous cases. The most general 
comparison being made could be to Katz v. United States, which has been the foundation 
for current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding one‘s legitimate expectation of 
privacy. Other cases may also be relevant, however, if the particular facts of the cases 
appear to be analogues of each other. Additionally, other cases have built upon Katz so it 
is quite likely that the reasoning used in these may also be relevant when comparing 
cases. Opinions often explicitly indicate what previous cases they are basing their 
decisions on, further making finding worthy cases for comparison convenient. The 
comparison must still be made, however, to ensure whether or not the reasoning remained 
consistent. Furthermore as one would expect if a principle were to be created due to 
address an issue unique to the internet then one can hardly expect a reference to a 
previous case. 
 With respect to more specific mapping of the reasoning used in cases one 
approach would be searching, for instance, whether the case applies the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test that is laid out in Katz. So both objective and subjective 
expectations of privacy will be key words when determining if and how the Katz test is 
applied. By examining whether or not courts apply this test as well as how they interpret 
the different expectations of privacy in a wholly new environment can speak to the ability 
of older principles to survive or be adapted when it comes to the internet. Given the 
importance the reasonable expectation of privacy test has had in Fourth Amendment 
cases it makes sense to use it as the backbone for comparison within cases. To find that a 
case abandons this test would signify a substantial departure from past principles. A 
second principle that may be important to look for would be the third party principle. 
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Though this principle is not explicitly mentioned in Katz it can come up in when 
considering the question of an expectation of privacy given that the principle claims one 
does not have an expectation of privacy with respect to information exposed to a third 
party. Perhaps this principle may come into play more often than usual on the internet 
since individuals may have more of a proclivity to think that they are anonymous online. 
 As has been noted it is the reasoning that will be scrutinized of any case that is 
taken into consideration.  Therefore there will be a consistency in methodology 
throughout the older cases used for comparison and the newer ones. Along with this 
consistency of approach this methodology further has the benefit of objectivity given that 
by their nature opinions are meant to be clear and easily understandable. This approach, 
therefore, should result in an accurate, first-hand, mapping of the way courts have or have 
not adapted to the internet with respect to Fourth Amendment cases. By comparing the 
reasoning used in internet-related cases to those involving other technological 
innovations it can be determined whether the internet is being treated as other 
technological innovations were. For instance if it is found that there is consistently a new 
type of reasoning utilized that is not found in older cases, then this may be indicative of 
the truly revolutionary nature of cyberspace under which previous methods are not 
applicable. Conversely to find a consistency in reasoning techniques between other 
technology types and the internet-related cases may indicate that cyberspace, though a 
much larger technological innovation, is still amenable to the old real-world techniques. 
 Perhaps the biggest potential problem that faces this type of research is a dearth of 
viable cases from which to draw upon. Given the pervasiveness of the internet, however, 
at least some high profile Fourth Amendment cases should be expected.  With people 
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performing crimes online it should be expected that law enforcement may at times be 
faced with Fourth Amendment questions in the course of performing their duties. The 
availability of potentially useful cases is undoubtedly most troublesome with respect to 
cases addressed by the Supreme Court. For this reason it would then be more prudent to 
include lower court rulings into the potential pool of cases taken into consideration. As 
has been noted, to add some refinement to the potential pool the field of potential cases 
will be reduced by considering only appellate court cases. Such an approach would have 
the benefit of providing a larger pool than merely Supreme Court cases while also 
ensuring that the more potentially controversial cases are taken into account. 
 The method used to gather useable cases also poses some difficulties. Given that 
it consists of poring over cases one at a time to determine whether they may or may not 
be relevant one cannot expect to include every potentially useful case. There is a danger, 
therefore, that a few particularly important and relevant cases may be overlooked in the 
selection process. Gathering a respectable amount of sample cases though may aid in 
remedying or at least minimizing the impact of this potential problem. 
 Another potential problem with conducting this type of research deals with 
consistency and is closely tied to the problem of the paucity of useable cases.  Given that 
the internet is such a relatively new innovation it is understandable that courts may still 
be grappling with how to react to it. As a result of the novelty of the technology one may 
then fear that courts may not have harmonized yet as to how to address the cases that 
arise. How can one expect perfect harmony when the issue being considered may not 
contain a real-world analogue close enough to base a decision on? When taken in the 
context of the purpose of this work this potential characteristic does not necessarily have 
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to pose an impediment. On the contrary, harmony or a lack there-of within the courts 
would in and of itself be informative given that the reasoning in these instances could be 
parsed to determine whether or not it still relies on the same fundamental principles as the 
older cases. 
 The case selection for the purposes outlined here requires two general types of 
cases to be gathered. First there needs to be a basis for comparison. This will be 
manifested by a selection of cases that display a conflict between the Fourth Amendment 
and some form of technological innovation that is not the internet. As noted, the specific 
issue in question will be whether or not a warrantless search is considered valid under the 
Fourth Amendment. The case of Katz v. United States will essentially be the baseline 
upon which the remaining cases will be compared given the prominence it holds in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The other cases used for comparison will then be 
examined to determine whether they too follow the rationale as presented in Katz when 
determining the validity of a warrantless search and if they do then how do they go about 
doing so. 
 The second type of case that is needed for the purposes presented here will 
consists of cases in which the Fourth Amendment conflicts in some manner with the 
internet. Given that the internet can be used for various functions, such as communication 
or transferring information, many of which could potentially be illegal, this aspect 
combined with its potential of allowing third parties to access these transactions means 
occasional run-ins with the Fourth Amendment can be expected. As previously described 
the specific type of Fourth Amendment question that will be examined in these cases is 
whether a warrantless search can be deemed valid. The manner in which the internet-
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related question go about determining this issue will then be compared to how it was 
done in the pre-internet cases. Trends or differences between the pre-internet and internet 
cases can then hopefully be more readily identified. Furthermore emerging principles 
may be identified if the reasoning between the two main groups is found to shift. 
 The result obtained from conducting this research could then be used in 
conjunction with other works, for instance work examining the relationship between the 
internet and the First Amendment, to lend some insight into the question pertaining to the 
degree to which the internet can be regulated or if it can be regulated at all. Regardless of 
the actual findings the results are sure to add another piece to the larger puzzle that 
represents the relationship between the law and the internet.  Seeing as how more and 
more aspects of every-day real-world life are becoming merged with the internet the 
import of better understanding this relationship is readily evident. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   38 
Chapter 3: Results 
 As has been mentioned before the manner in which the relationship between the 
Fourth Amendment and the internet will be examined will be by considering how cases 
involving the Fourth Amendment and the internet are treated by the court when 
considered vis-à-vis the reasoning used by the court in other Fourth Amendment cases 
involving technology. The case of Katz v. United States (389 U.S. 347, 1967) will 
function as the baseline case upon which remaining cases will be examined. The reason 
behind this is because Katz established the reasonable expectation of privacy test that 
courts use to determine whether a person holds a legitimate expectation of privacy under 
the Fourth Amendment with respect to the object or items seized or searched that may 
then invalidate that search. Subsequent cases can then be considered to determine 
whether they followed the reasoning in Katz in determining whether the warrantless 
searches in their situations were valid or not. The case studies will be presented here in 
chronological order in order to more easily identify trends, or the lack thereof, throughout 
the various technologies. Other pre-internet cases involving some form of technology will 
first be examined to determine how they compare to Katz. Finally internet-related cases 
will be examined to evaluate whether the reasoning used by the courts was consistent.  
 
Non-Internet Cases 
 The first and most fundamental case that must be examined for the purposes 
presented here is Katz v. United States (389 U.S. 347, 1967). The precedent established 
by this case will be followed to determine whether it still holds in the age of the internet. 
In this case Charles Katz was recorded by an electronic eavesdropping device, without 
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having first gotten a warrant, placed outside a public phone booth. He was using the 
phone to place illegal gambling bets. Katz was convicted because of the recordings and 
appealed his conviction, claiming the recordings violated his Fourth Amendment rights. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed Katz‘s conviction. Ultimately, however, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari and ruled in Katz‘s favor.  
 This case is suited as one of the cases for comparison because not only is it a 
landmark case with respect to the Fourth Amendment but it also deals with the conflict 
between the Fourth Amendment and technology. The Court addressed whether a search 
required a physical intrusion to take place, given that Katz was not physically searched 
by police officers. Furthermore the Court asked whether a telephone booth is a location 
under which one can expect a right to privacy. These questions are deemed key by the 
court when determining whether a search without a warrant is valid under the Fourth 
Amendment.  
 The case of Katz v. United States established the expectation of privacy test. This 
test helps determine whether a warrantless search is justified under the Fourth 
Amendment. It was justice Harlan‘s concurrence that created the test now employed in 
these types of cases. Justice Harlan summarized the Court‘s opinion to mean 
(a) that an enclosed telephone booth is an area where, like a home, Weeks 
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, and unlike a field, Hester v. United States, 
265 U.S. 57, a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable 
expectation of privacy; (b) that electronic as well as physical intrusion into 
a place that is in this sense private may constitute a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment; and (c) that the invasion of a constitutionally protected area 
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by federal authorities is, as the Court has long held, presumptively 
unreasonable in the absence of a search warrant. (Katz v. United States 
1967, 360-361)  
Justice Harlan then outlined a test in which there are two elements that must be 
demonstrated in order for someone to claim a legitimate expectation of privacy under the 
Fourth Amendment. These elements are ―first that a person have exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‗reasonable‘‖ (Katz v. United States 1967, 361). To find that the 
application of this test persist throughout different technologies as well as the internet 
would indicate that the internet may be amenable to a degree to current laws, meaning it 
is not necessarily a ―no man‘s land‖ in the eyes of the law. 
 When deciding the issue in question in Katz the Court stated that the 
―Government‘s activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner‘s 
words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone 
booth and this constituted a ‗search and seizure‘ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment‖ (Katz v. United States 1967, 353). According to the Court Katz‘s 
expectation of privacy when entering a phone booth was both subjectively and 
objectively reasonable given that with respect to phone booths; ―one who occupies it, 
shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely 
entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to 
the world‖ (Katz v. United States 1967, 352). After Katz other kinds of technological 
innovations also came under scrutiny when it came to the Fourth Amendment. 
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 Following Katz the Court once again looked at the implications of technology on 
the Fourth Amendment in Smith v. Maryland (442 U.S. 735, 1979). In this case Michael 
Smith kept calling the house of a woman he had robbed. Based on information given to 
them by the woman the police identified his car and by tracing his license plate found his 
address. The police then asked the telephone company to install a pen register in order to 
record the phone numbers dialed from Smith‘s home. A pen register is an electronic 
device that records the dialed numbers from a specified phone line. Based on the 
installation gathered from this pen register the police confirmed that Smith was indeed 
calling his victim and then charged him with robbery. Smith argued that the use of the 
pen register constituted an illegal search as understood by the Fourth Amendment. 
Similarly to Katz the Court had to determine whether the use of this piece of technology 
could truly be considered a search under the Fourth Amendment. 
 The Court argued that ―the application of the Fourth Amendment depends on 
whether the person invoking its protection can claim a ‗justifiable,‘ a ‗reasonable,‘ or a 
‗legitimate expectation of privacy‘ that has been invaded by government action‖ (Smith v. 
Maryland 1979, 740). The Court agreed with the Katz Court when it found that to 
determine whether the Fourth Amendment protection extends to a claim of this kind that 
the test outlined in Katz was adequate. Unlike the Katz Court, the Smith Court did not 
believe that the use of a pen register constituted a ―search‖ given that its use did not 
violate Smith‘s reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court first claimed it they did not 
believe people generally hold an expectation of privacy with respect to the phone 
numbers they dial. The reason behind this being that ―all telephone users realize that they 
must ‗convey‘ phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is through telephone 
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company switching equipment that their calls are completed‖ (Smith v. Maryland 1979, 
742). Furthermore the Court noted that the location from which the phone number was 
dialed was immaterial, even if it is from the privacy one one‘s own house, given that 
―regardless of his location, petitioner had to convey that number to the telephone 
company in precisely the same way if he wished to complete his call‖ (Smith v. Maryland 
1979, 743). Therefore the court concluded one could not hold a reasonable subjective 
expectation of privacy when dialing numbers on their phone. 
  With respect to the second prong of the test the Court reiterated that ―a person 
has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third 
parties‖ (Smith v. Maryland 1979, 743-744). Therefore ―when he used his phone, 
petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and 
‗exposed‘ that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business‖ (Smith v. 
Maryland 1979, 744). The Court reasoned then that when one dials numbers on the 
telephone these numbers are essentially being transmitted to a third party, meaning the 
phone company, in doing so the dialers assume the risk of those numbers being given up 
to the police by the telephone company. Given this dynamic the Court argued that one 
cannot claim that society would recognize such a willing conveyance of information as 
compatible with an expectation of privacy. Therefore taking these two findings the Court 
concluded that Smith ―entertained no actual expectation of privacy in the phone numbers 
he dialed, and that, even if he did, his expectation was not ‗legitimate‘‖ so the use of the 
pen register ―was not a ‗search,‘ and no warrant was required‖ (Smith v. Maryland 1979, 
745-746). 
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 Whereas Katz and Smith involved technological innovations more specifically 
designed for the purposes of gathering information in California v. Ciraolo (476 U.S. 
207, 1986) a different kind of innovation was scrutinized. The issue addressed in 
California v. Ciraolo involved the implications of the Fourth Amendment when it came 
to aerial observation. Police received an anonymous tip wherein the caller told them 
Dante Ciraolo was growing marijuana in his backyard. A fence shielded the crop from 
observation at ground level. Officers flew in a private plane over the area and were able 
to confirm that there was a marijuana crop in the backyard. A search warrant was 
obtained based on these officer‘s actions. Ciraolo pleaded guilty of marijuana cultivation 
after the trial court refused to suppress the evidence. The Court of Appeals, however, 
reversed the decision. This decision was ultimately reversed once again by the Supreme 
Court. The type of technology in question is the aerial surveillance that granted the police 
the ability to observe activity they otherwise may not have seen. The Court had to 
determine whether the type of surveillance made possible by using the plane was valid 
without a warrant. 
 Once again the Court‘s reasoning in this case revolved around the Katz test. With 
respect to Ciraolo‘s subjective expectation of privacy the Court noted he ―met the test of 
manifesting his own subjective intent and desire to maintain privacy as to his unlawful 
agricultural pursuits‖ given that he constructed a 10 foot fence around his marijuana 
crop(California v. Ciraolo 1986, 211). With respect to the second portion of the test the 
Court argued that even though Ciraolo had erected the fence ―any member of the public 
flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that [the] officers 
observed‖ (California v. Ciraolo 1876, 213-214). Ciraolo could therefore not claim he 
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had a reasonable expectation of privacy given that though he had a valid subjective 
expectation of privacy, he did not have a valid objective one. The Court concluded that 
the ―Fourth Amendment simply does not require the police traveling in the public 
airways at this altitude to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is visible to the naked 
eye‖ (California v. Ciraolo 1876, 215). 
 The case of United States v. Meriwether (917 F.2d 955, 1990) presents a few 
interesting findings with respect to how the court viewed technological changes. Upon 
executing a search warrant DEA agents found a pager belonging to one of two men 
arrested on the scene. The agents monitored the pager and recorded several of the phone 
numbers that sent messages to it. One number that appeared repeatedly was chosen at 
random and was called by an agent. The man who answered was Chester Meriwether and 
he set up a meeting with the agent, who was pretending to be someone else, where he 
would buy $4,800 worth of cocaine. The agents showed up to the meeting and arrested 
Meriwether. Meriwether attempted to have all the evidence related to the phone 
conversations suppressed but was denied. On appeal the court was faced with answering 
the question of whether Meriwether‘s Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the 
agents attained his phone number from the pager. Even though the agents in this case had 
a search warrant this case is still acceptable for the purposes presented here because the 
court explicitly asks whether the search of the pager would still have been valid had the 
search warrant not included the contents of the pager. It is this specific portion of the case 
that will be scrutinized. 
 This case‘s reasoning is significant for two reasons; one being that it presents a 
kind of reasoning that speaks to the ever evolving way in which information is stored 
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through technological means. Second the court once again applied the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test to yet another type of technological innovation.  In 
Meriwether the court  agreed with the lower court‘s claim that retrieving a number from a 
pager is akin to retrieving a number from someone‘s personal telephone book, noting that 
―the digital display pager, by its very nature, is nothing more than a contemporary 
receptacle for telephone numbers‖ (United States v. Meriwether 1990, 958). This claim 
by the court is supported by the arguments made in United States v. Reyes (798 F.2d 380, 
1986) where, in questioning how specific a warrant needed to be, that court noted ―in the 
age of modern technology and commercial availability of various forms of items, the 
warrant could not be expected to describe with exactitude the precise form records could 
take‖ (United States v. Reyes 1986, 383). The court concluded that the warrant in 
question in Meriwether was broad enough to allow the pager numbers to be looked at. 
The implications of the court‘s reasoning here may then be especially significant in the 
age of computers given that they serve a wide array of purposes. For instance computers 
by themselves could be seen as akin to file cabinets storing a wide array of files 
furthermore in the age of the internet with the advent of programs such as Skype 
computers can also function similarly to telephones that also store contact information of 
many individuals. 
 Though the court found the warrant in question to be valid in this case, it went 
beyond this and questioned if the Fourth Amendment claim made by the appellant would 
still carry weight had the warrant not been valid. The court reasoned that in Katz the 
defendant was justified in his expectation of privacy in the phone booth so the actions 
taken by the police in that case were accurately considered a search and seizure. To 
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determine whether the information gathered from the pager constituted a search and 
seizure in this case the court applied the Katz test. The court argued that when someone 
sends a message to a pager they have no real way of knowing who will be on the 
receiving end of that message; it could be the intended recipient or a police officer that 
has just arrested that intended recipient. So he failed ―to show that he sought to preserve a 
message as private by transmitting it into a paging receiver over which he [had] no 
control‖ (United States v. Meriwether 1990, 959). He therefore could not claim an 
expectation of privacy given he had no certainty as to who would receive his messages, 
so the actions by the police did not qualify as a search and seizure. So had the warrant not 
been valid the court still would not have considered that the appellant‘s Fourth 
Amendment rights were violated.  
 The following two cases, the first being United States v. Pinson (24 F.3d 1056, 
1994), are significant because both employed the Katz rationale but they were later 
overturned by a third case that did not. The case of United States v. Pinson dealt with yet 
another technological innovation that raised Fourth Amendment questions. The case 
involved an infrared device that was able to detect heat emanating from a structure. 
Police learned that Joseph Pinson‘s house had received packages from known suppliers 
of hydroponic growing equipment. They also subpoenaed the utility records for Pinson‘s 
residence as well as those of some other nearby residences. The records indicated a large 
amount of electrical usage by Pinson‘s residence which the police claimed was indicative 
of the amount needed to maintain an indoor marijuana crop. Based on this information 
the police mounted a Forward Looking Infrared Device (FLIR) onto a police helicopter 
an flew over Pinson‘s residence. The device revealed a large amount of heat emanating 
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from a covered window, the roof, and a skylight of the residence. Using this information 
the police obtained a search warrant and found an indoor marijuana growing operation in 
the third floor of Pinson‘s residence. Pinson claimed that the observation of his residence 
with the FLIR violated his Fourth Amendment rights given that it was conducted prior to 
the police attaining a search warrant. 
 The court claimed that ―a party claiming to have suffered an unlawful invasion in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment must establish as a threshold matter that he had a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the object searched or seized‖ (United States v. 
Pinson 1994, 1058). To determine whether a legitimate expectation of privacy was 
present the court turned to the Katz test. With respect to the question of a subjective 
expectation of privacy in this case the court found the escaping heat from the structure to 
be comparable to discarded garbage. Given that discarded garbage had previously been 
found to not be worthy of a subjective expectation of privacy the court reasoned that in 
this case there was ―no reasonable expectation of privacy in heat which Pinson 
voluntarily vented outside‖ (United States v. Pinson 1994, 1058). With respect to the 
objective expectation of privacy the court once again employed an analogy declaring the 
use of an infrared device ―analogous to the warrantless use of police dogs trained to sniff 
and identify the presence of drugs‖ and expanding on this noting that ―just as odor 
escapes a compartment or building and is detected by the sense-enhancing instrument of 
a canine sniff, so also does heat escape a home and is detected by the sense-enhancing 
infrared camera‖ (United States v. Pinson 1994, 1058). Claiming an expectation of 
privacy against the use of the infrared sensors in this case failed both portions of the Katz 
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test, so Pinson‘s claim that the warrantless search by using the infrared device violated 
his Fourth Amendment rights was denied 
 A thermal imager was under scrutiny once again in United States v. Ford (34 F.3d 
992, 1994) and it was handled using the same fundamental principle. After receiving 
information that Jerry Ford and Dorothy Ford Longmire were growing marijuana inside a 
mobile home police officers set up surveillance outside the home. Using a thermal imager 
they detected a large amount of heat emanating from the trailer‘s floor and walls. The 
heat was consistent with the kind emitted from other indoor growing operations. This 
information contributed partly to the police obtaining a search warrant for the mobile 
home. Ford had boarded up the windows to prevent light from escaping and had also 
created holes in the floor supplemented by blowers in order to vent the excess heat 
created by the lights. Ford, like Pinson, argued the use of the thermal imager constituted 
an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment. 
 The court noted that it had to decide whether the use of the imager constituted a 
search under the Fourth Amendment. To answer this it noted that ―the touchstone for this 
decision is whether the alleged search violated the defendant‘s legitimate expectations of 
privacy‖ (United States v. Ford 1994, 995). Once again the court attempted to answer this 
question by establishing whether Ford satisfied the Katz test. With respect to his 
subjective expectation of privacy the court noted that ―while Ford was careful to prevent 
any light from escaping the mobile home – for example, by boarding the windows from 
the inside -- he took affirmative steps to vent the excess heat that was detected by the 
FDLE‘s thermal imager‖ (United States v. Ford 1994, 995). So while he tried to keep the 
extra light he created secret, he actively tried to vent the extra heat from his home. Given 
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this behavior the court argued that Ford ―did not seek to preserve the fact of that heat as 
private‖ so he could not claim a subjective expectation of privacy with respect to what 
the heat the imager detected (United States v. Ford 1994, 995).  
 With respect to Ford‘s objective expectation of privacy the court compared the 
thermal imager to aerial observation, claiming that like aerial observation the thermal 
imager was not powerful enough to actually reveal ―the intimacy of detail and activity 
protected by the Fourth Amendment‖ (United States v. Ford 1994, 996). The court went 
beyond this, however, and once again compared the heat emanating from the house to 
discarded waste, which had previously been found to not possess an objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy. Furthermore, even though the elements that Ford 
exposed were not visible to a normal passerby, the court referred to aerial observation 
and drug sniffing dogs to illustrate that tools used to enhance the senses do not 
necessarily render an instance of surveillance as unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 The third and perhaps more significant case involving a thermal imager to be 
examined here is Kyllo v. United States (533 U.S. 27, 2001). The reason that this is of 
particular interest for the purposes presented here is that unlike the previous two cases 
involving thermal imagers that upheld their use without a warrant, this one invalidated 
the use of an imager without a warrant. In this case after a United States Department of 
the Interior agent suspected that marijuana was being grown in the home of Danny Kyllo 
he used a thermal imager to scan the home. The agent was aware that indoor growing 
operations required high-intensity lamps which would create a heat signature that the 
imager could detect from the outside. The agent‘s scan with the imager took only a few 
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minutes and was conducted from both the street in front of the house and the street 
behind the house. The results of the scan indicated that certain parts of the home were 
relatively hot when compared to other parts and that the home itself was also hotter than 
the surrounding homes. From the scan the agent concluded that Kyllo was growing 
marijuana indoors. Based party on the results from the thermal imaging scan the agent 
was able to acquire a search warrant for the home which resulted in the finding of over 
100 marijuana plants. Kyllo argued that the use of the thermal imager violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights. 
 In its opinion for Kyllo the court cited Katz as its guide to determine whether a 
search is a search under the sense of the Fourth Amendment or not. The Court claimed 
that ―it would be foolish to content that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the 
Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance in technology‖ (Kyllo v. 
United States 2001, 33-34). As support for this statement the Court cited aerial 
observation, where the contents and actions of a fenced in backyard may have been 
completely private in the past, the advent of the airplane makes it so that these locations 
can be monitored from above. The Court‘s concern though is to attempt to determine 
―what limits there are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed 
privacy‖ (Kyllo v. United States 2001, 34). The Court in this case noted that with respect 
to the interior of the home ―there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in the common law, 
of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be 
reasonable‖ (Kyllo v. United States 2001, 34). To allow the use of technology to erode 
from the minimum protection granted within the home would then erode the guaranteed 
privacy granted by the Fourth Amendment. The court then held that 
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obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the 
interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without 
physical ―intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,‖ Silverman, 365 
U.S. at 512, constitutes a search – at least where (as here) the technology 
in question is not in general public use. (Kyllo v. United States 2001, 34). 
Therefore the court found that the information obtained by the thermal imager was the 
product of a search. Given that this search was conducted without a warrant the findings 
were then invalid. 
 The Court also addressed the points made in the previous thermal imager cases 
that claimed that the imager merely measure heat outside the home. This type of 
argument was rejected by directly referencing Katz noting that in that case the 
eavesdropping device was invalidated even though it could have been said that it ―picked 
up only sound waves that reached the exterior of the phone booth‖ (Kyllo v. United States 
2001, 35). The court further argued that to allow such a claim to stand would run the risk 
of one day allowing some form of technology, for instance highly advanced thermal 
imagers, which could essentially grant complete knowledge of what went on inside a 
house. Ultimately though the Court in this instance did reference the Katz test it did not 
apply it given that it did not consider that its application was necessary when considering 
the actions Kyllo took within his home. 
 Common threads of reasoning that can be seen throughout the older cases 
examined above are that analogies are often utilized in order to ground these technologies 
to more understandable phenomena and make it easier to apply previous decisions to 
them. Furthermore when determining the legitimacy of an expectation of privacy in order 
   52 
to determine whether a warrantless search was valid the courts deferred to the two 
pronged test outlined in Katz regardless of the technology used during the search. With 
respect to the internet then, to find that these trends continue would lend support to the 
notion that the internet is not an innovation so different that the courts‘ past tools no 
longer apply. With this in mind it is now time to examine cases where issues rise around 
the nexus between computers and the internet. 
 
Internet-Related Cases 
 The case United States v. Simons (206 F.3d 392, 2000) is one of the earlier cases 
exemplifying the conflict that may occur between the Fourth Amendment and the 
internet. Mark Simons worked for the Foreign Bureau of Information Services (FBIS), a 
division of the CIA, and was provided a private office as well as a computer with internet 
access. The FBIS has a policy stating that internet use by employees was for official 
government business only. The policy explicitly forbade accessing unlawful material. 
Furthermore the policy warned that FBIS would ensure compliance with the policy by 
conducting electronic audits. When a manager was better familiarizing himself with a 
recently acquired firewall by entering the keyword ―sex‖ he discovered that a large 
amount of hits originated from Simons‘ computer. It was readily evident from the 
websites‘ names that Simons had not been accessing them for work-related reasons. 
 A manager was contacted who then had a network administrator access Simons‘ 
computer to determine whether he had downloaded any of the pictures from the sites he 
had visited to his computer. The administrator printed the file names of the pictures as 
well as copied the files from Simons‘ hard drive. These tasks were all done remotely, 
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from the administrator‘s desk. Later the copied files were examined by members of the 
CIA Office of the Inspector General (OIG) who determined that some of the pictures 
were of minors. Then Simons‘ hard drive was removed from his computer and replaced 
with a copy and the original was given to an OIG criminal investigator. Based on the 
images from the hard drive a search warrant was attained for the files on Simons‘ 
computer as well as other materials in his office, such as diskettes and zip drives.  
 After being charged Simons tried to suppress the evidence gathered from the 
searches of his computer and office. Simons claimed the initial search of his computer by 
the firewall operator violated his Fourth Amendment rights since it had been performed 
without a warrant. The internet comes into play in two forms in this case. The first is as a 
tool Simons used to commit his crime, using it to attain child pornography. The second is 
as a tool used to search and gather evidence against Simons. It should be noted here that 
for the purposes of this work a computer network will be deemed analogous to access to 
the internet given that it grants many of the same properties, such as searching and 
communicating, but on a smaller scale.  
 The court in this case noted that ―to establish a violation of his rights under the 
Fourth Amendment, Simons must first prove that he had a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the place searched or the item seized‖ (United States v. Simons 2000, 398). To 
determine whether Simons presented a legitimate expectation of privacy the court relied 
on the Katz test. When trying to determine whether Simons demonstrated a legitimate 
objective expectation of privacy the court employed a line of reasoning that has been 
used in some cases above. This reasoning is that of creating an analogy between a novel 
form of technology to a more well-known and mundane phenomena. The Simons court 
   54 
did this by pointing to O’Connor v Ortega in claiming that while ―government employees 
may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their offices or in parts of their offices 
such as their desks or file cabinets‖ it is also the case that ―office practices, procedures, or 
regulations may reduce legitimate privacy expectations‖ (United States v. Simons 2000, 
398).   
 The court felt that the reasoning given in O’Connor was applicable for Simons‘ 
situation because Simons‘ employer had a policy warning its employees that their internet 
use would be periodically monitored. Therefore, given that the court in O’Connor 
decided that having a comparable policy removed an employee‘s expectation of privacy, 
the court in this case found that ―in light of the Internet policy, Simons lacked a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the files downloaded from the Internet‖ (United 
States v. Simons 2000, 398). Even if Simons may have subjectively thought his actions on 
the Internet remained private ―such a belief was not objectively reasonable after [his 
employer] notified him that it would be overseeing his Internet use‖ (United States v. 
Simons 2000, 398). The Court likened Simons‘ usage of the internet after being warned 
that it would be subject to observation as him merely exposing his actions to a third party. 
The court concluded then that the search and seizure of Simons‘ computer and the files 
he downloaded from the internet did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
 The case of United States v. Hambrick (U.S. App. LEXIS 18665, 2000) presented 
a situation much different than the kind found in Simons, indicating the potential variance 
of situations in which the Fourth Amendment may conflict with the internet. Scott 
Hambrick, a police captain, first contacted someone using the screen name Rory14 in an 
on-line chat-room called ―#gaydads4sons.‖ Hambrick believed that Rory14 was a 
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fourteen-year-old boy. Hambrick tried to start a sexual relationship with Rory14 and even 
sent $270 to a Post Office Box that Rory14 had given him. Along with the money 
Hambrick also sent detailed instructions with respect to meeting arrangements. 
Throughout all this correspondence Hambrick was unaware that Rory14 was actually 
Detective J.L. MacLaughlin, who was a member of a regional task force against internet 
crimes aimed at children.  
 After Hambrick and MacLaughlin, still under the guise of Rory14, chatted several 
times MacLaughlin sent Hambrick‘s Internet Service Provider (ISP) a subpoena asking 
for non-content information pertaining to Hambrick, who was only know to the 
detectives by his username at the time. The government later conceded during the trial 
that this subpoena was invalid given the faulty manner in which it was attained. The ISP 
complied with the subpoena and handed over Hambricks name, billing address, and IP 
address among other types of identifying information. After gathering this information 
MacLaughlin handed it, as well as control of the Rory14 account, over to the FBI. The 
FBI gathered more information from the ISP by using a ―grand jury subpoena‖ which 
then helped them get a search warrant for Hambrick‘s residence. Hambrick argued the 
information gathered from his ISP had violated his Fourth Amendment rights given that it 
had been attained without using a valid warrant.  
 The court in this case once again cited Katz in its opinion noting that therein ―the 
Supreme Court analyzed the scope of protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment, 
stating that a search occurs only when there has been a ‗physical intrusion‘ in a 
‗constitutionally protected area,‘ noting further that the Fourth Amendment ‗protects 
people not places‘‖ (United States v. Hambrick 2000, 6). To determine whether the 
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Fourth Amendment protection applied the court once again referenced Katz and the test it 
delineated to determine whether Hambrick had a legitimate expectation of privacy. In 
actually applying the Katz test in this instance the court‘s reasoning relied heavily on 
Smith. As Smith found that some information given to the telephone company in the form 
of dialed numbers was not protected by the Fourth Amendment, the court in this case 
reasoned that ―a person does not have an interest in the account information given to the 
ISP in order to establish [an] e-mail account‖ (United States v. Hambrick 2000, 12). Both 
the Smith and Hambrick courts considered the type of information that was given to the 
companies in these two cases was non-content information and therefore did not fall 
under Fourth Amendment protection. Furthermore the court re-iterated that ―when an 
individual conveys information to a third party, the individual ‗assumes the risk‘ of 
subsequent disclosure‖ (United States v. Hambrick 2000, 9). Therefore, since Hambrick 
voluntarily gave up certain, non-content, information to his service provider he had no 
legitimate expectation of privacy when it came to that information. 
 The case of Guest v. Leis (255 F.3d 325, 2001) involved another manner in which 
people socialize while online that was separate from the online chat rooms presented in 
Hambrick. The expectation of privacy that individuals have when posting in online 
bulletin boards was one issue in question in Guest v. Leis. The Hamilton County, Ohio, 
Regional Electronic Computer Intelligence Task Force (RECI) seized two computer 
bulletin board systems while in the process of investigating on-line obscenity. The 
systems seized were the Cincinnati Computer Connection Bulletin Board System (CCC 
BBS) and the Spanish Inquisition Bulletin Board System (SI BBS). Several users of each 
of the systems filed class action suits against RECI claiming they had violated the First 
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and Fourth Amendments among other violations. Though the agents in this case had valid 
warrants for the homes of those that hosted the bulletin boards, the users argued the 
search of the content they had transmitted to the boards had been done without a valid 
warrant once the host systems were seized. 
 In its opinion the court claimed that ―in order to challenge a search or seizure as a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, a person must have had a subjective expectation of 
privacy in the place or property to be searched which was objectively reasonable‖ (Guest 
v. Leis 2001, 333). This line of reasoning is of course consistent with that outlined in 
Katz. As was noted the case dealt with two bulletin board communities and the court 
affirmed that with respect to the users of the boards that  they ―would of course have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their homes and in their belongings—including 
computers—inside the home‖ (Guest v. Leis 2001, 333).  Yet the court differentiated this 
expectation of privacy to the one the users have with respect to the servers on which the 
bulletin boards were hosted. Given that the users did not have any physical claim to the 
actual computers on which the boards‘ servers were hosted the court argued that they 
―would not share the same interest in someone else‘s house or computers, so they would 
not be able to challenge the search of the homes and the seizure of the computers as 
physical objects‖ (Guest v. Leis 2001, 333). The court went further and addressed the 
issue of the actual content that may be stored on seized computer that users may try to 
stake a privacy claim on. 
 With respect to one of the bulletin boards, the court dealt with the issue by 
pointing out that there was a disclaimer each user saw informing them that the messages 
they posted were not private. Therefore, as in Simons, the users could not claim an 
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objective privacy claim in the case. With respect to the second bulletin board, however, 
there was no such disclaimer. Once again the court found that there was no Fourth 
Amendment violation. The reasoning behind this was the same as that used in United 
States v. King wherein it was found that when someone sends content information 
through conventional mail, the sender loses their expectation of privacy with respect to 
that content upon delivery. Similarly in this case the court argued that ―users would 
logically lack a legitimate expectation of privacy in the materials intended for publication 
or public posting‖ (Guest v. Leis 2001, 333).  This is the case because the court 
considered posts to the bulletin board to be similar to emails available for the public to 
see so ―they would lose a legitimate expectation of privacy in an e-mail that had already 
reached its recipient‖ (Guest v. Leis 2001, 333). Therefore the content any users may 
have posted on the bulletin board could not be said to be objectively private. Given these 
findings the court ruled that there were no Fourth Amendment violations. 
 In United States v. Angevine (281 F.3d 1130, 2002) a situation similar to that of 
Simons was presented. Eric Angevine was a professor of Architecture at Oklahoma State 
University. The University provided him with an office computer connected to both the 
University network as well as the internet. Angevine used the computer to download 
thousands of pornographic images of young boys, printed them, then deleted the images 
from his computer. Using the help of Angevine‘s wife the police were able to obtain a 
search warrant for his University computer. After seizing the computer the police were 
able to retrieve pornographic files that had remained in the memory despite Angevine‘s 
attempts of deletion. Angevine argued that the warrant the police obtained was invalid 
because the police had recklessly omitted important information in the affidavit they used 
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to obtain the warrant. Simlarly as in Meriwether described above, even though the 
warrant in this case was found to be valid the court specifically addresses the question of 
whether this search would have been valid under the Fourth Amendment even if there 
had been no warrant. 
 The court argued that in order to establish a Fourth Amendment violation 
Angevine must have demonstrated a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place search 
or the item seized. The existence of this expectation in turn was determined by the 
application of the test outlined in Katz. Once again in this case the court pointed to the 
policy that Angevine‘s employer, the Oklahoma State University, had in place with 
respect to internet use. The university‘s policy included warnings that they ―reserved the 
right to randomly audit Internet use‖ as well as any information flowing through the 
network would not be ―confidential either in transit or storage‖ (United States v. 
Angevine 2002, 1134). The court in this case concluded that ―Oklahoma State University 
policies and procedures prevent its employees from reasonably expecting privacy in data 
downloaded from the Internet onto University computers‖ given that it warned the user of 
the potential for monitoring the Internet use of individuals (United States v. Angevine 
2002, 1134). Therefore the court found that Angevine‘s Fourth Amendment rights were 
not violated since he did not present a legitimate expectation of privacy. 
 Another case involving one‘s expectation of privacy while using the internet in 
the workplace is United States v. Slanina (283 F.3d 670, 2002). Wesley Slanina was a 
Fire Marshall for Webster, Texas whose desk was in City Hall. His city-provided 
computer had internet access but was not connected to the office network. After a new 
fire station was built Slanina was given his own office in the new building. He moved his 
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old computer into the new office wherein he had no internet access or network 
connection. Later on Ryan Smith, the Management Information Systems Coordinator, 
began work on installing the city‘s network onto the computers in the new fire station. 
Slanina was not at work the day Smith was going to install the network on his computer. 
When Smith attempted to do so he found that even though the computer was on it had a 
password-protected screensaver. Smith attempted to bypass this problem by restarting the 
computer only to discover that Slanina also had a BIOS password. Without this password 
Smith would be unable to access the computer‘s hard drive and would therefore be 
unable to install the network on his computer.  
 Smith called Slanina‘s supervisor who in turn called Slanina to obtain the 
password. The supervisor informed Slanina of the situation and told him to give Smith 
the password. Slanina was reluctant to give him his password and wanted to know 
exactly what Smith planned to do on the computer. To Smith‘s surprise roughly 10 
minutes after getting the password Slanina showed up at the office asking how much 
longer the installation would take. Smith was suspicious by this point and told Slanina it 
would take hours when he knew it would take less. Slanina stayed for a while and would 
hop on his computer whenever Smith left the room. After Slanina left Smith noticed that 
he had left his email running while minimized. As Smith attempted to close it he noticed 
that Slanina had subscribed to newsgroups. Smith had been told that employees were 
barred from accessing newsgroups from work, but not all employees had been informed 
of this policy, including Slanina. Smith expanded the email to examine the newsgroups 
Slanina frequented. He noticed some of them were pornographic in nature with one‘s 
name implying it featured child pornography. Smith contact several supervisors and the 
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next day, with Slanina still out of the office, they examined his computer more closely 
including his zip drive and found child pornography on it. Ultimately all the evidence 
was handed over to the FBI. Slanina questioned the validity of this search given that it 
was performed without a warrant. 
 The court‘s decision with respect to Slanina‘s expectation of privacy differs in 
this case when compared to the previously examined cases. The court looked into 
Slanina‘s expectation of privacy in order to determine whether his claim that his Fourth 
Amendment rights were violated had any merit. With respect to a subjective expectation 
of privacy the court accepted that Slanina did express this, noting that his computer was 
in his office, his door was closed and locked, and furthermore his office computer was 
protected against third parties by having a password on it. Furthermore even though 
Slanina willingly gave his password to a third party the court found that he still rightly 
had a subjective expectation of privacy given that the password was given for a very 
limited purpose. 
 With respect to the second prong of the test, determining whether his expectation 
of privacy was objectively reasonable, the court once again sided with Slanina. Part of the 
reasoning behind this was that ―even though network administrators and computer 
technicians necessarily had some access to his computer, there [was] no evidence that 
such access was routine‖ (United States v. Slanina 2002, 676). Furthermore the court 
found that in this case, as opposed to in Simons, there was no dissemination of ―any 
policy that prevented the storage of personal information on city computers‖ by the city, 
Slanina‘s employer, and also it ―did not inform its employees that computer usage and 
internet access would be monitored‖ (United States v. Slanina 2002, 676).  Therefore 
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―given the absence of a city policy placing Slanina on notice that his computer usage 
would be monitored and the lack of any indication that other employees had routine 
access to his computer‖ the court found that the objective prong of the Katz test was also 
satisfied (United States v. Slanina 2002, 677).  
 However, even though the court found that Slanina had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in both his office and computer the court still upheld the warrantless search. 
The reasoning behind this decision relied heavily on O’Connor v. Ortega (480 U.S. 709, 
1987). O’Connor presented a somewhat comparable real-world counterpart to Slanina‘s 
situation given that it dealt with a doctor‘s desk and file cabinets that were search by a 
state hospital administrator without a warrant. Though the Court found in that case that 
the doctor held a reasonable expectation of privacy they still upheld the warrantless 
search noting that ―public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy 
interests of government employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well 
as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of 
reasonableness under all circumstances‖ (O’Connor v. Ortega 1987, 725-726). The court 
in this case then ultimately agreed with the O’Connor Court and upheld the warrantless 
search. 
 The case of United States v. Lifshitz (369 F.3d 173, 2004) is a relatively unique 
case given that it involves and individual on probation, which presents new 
considerations for the court. After the FBI had conducted an investigation in which they 
found that Brandon Lifshitz had been downloading child pornography as well as 
disseminating it by posting it on websites Lifshitz pled guilty pursuant to a plea bargain 
he had made. Part of Lifshitz‘s deal included a lesser punishment because he had argued 
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he was suffering from a reduced mental capacity at the time of his offense. The court, 
taking the opinions of four doctors into consideration, ended up sentencing Lifshitz to 
three years‘ probation.  
 One of Lifshitz‘s conditions of probation was that he would allow his computer to 
be monitored on a regular or random basis. He would also have to allow the copying of 
all the data from his computer and any peripherals for the purpose of conducting a more 
thorough examination. This was the condition that Lifshitz‘s defense objected to given 
that this would amount to Lifshitz being subject to many unwarranted searches, violating 
his Fourth Amendment rights. 
 As has been noted in many of the cases examined above, including those 
involving older technological innovations, analogies are often used in order to make a 
novel situation more manageable. In this the court questioned the potential problem that 
may arise when using analogies with respect to computers. The problem with trying to 
compare computer monitoring with other actions arises given that  
ultimately, the attempt to establish the best point of comparison with all 
computer monitoring may prove futile, because computers serve a 
multiplicity of functions, from mailbox (in sending and receiving e-mail), 
to telephone (in accessing particular IP addresses and web pages), to 
financial systems (by both permitting on-line payment mechanism and 
recording personal financial data), to home offices, to storage bins. 
(United States v. Lifshitz 2004, 183) 
A blanket comparison about computer monitoring, then, cannot always be applied 
between computers and real-world actions. Despite this word of caution, however, the 
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court noted that ―the available analogies do, however, provide some assistance in 
assessing the nature and scope of a potential intrusion into computer privacy‖ (United 
States v. Lifshitz 2004, 183). In this particular case, then, the Court considered the 
analogy between drug testing and the type of computer monitoring in question.  
 When addressing the issue at hand the Lifshitz court acknowledged, citing Guest, 
that while individuals generally possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in their home 
computers, they may not enjoy such an expectation of privacy in transmissions over the 
internet or email that have already arrived at the recipient. The way in which this case 
differed from other similar cases, however, is that Lifshitz, being on probation, was 
judged against the ―special needs‖ of probationary searches. The court identified the 
―special needs‖ standard as it was described in Griffin v. Wisconsin (483 U.S. 868, 1987) 
and expanded upon in United States v. Knights (534 U.S. 112, 2001). The court took the 
rulings in these cases to amount to mean that ―in the case of a probationer, the imposition 
of a search condition as part of probation creates a diminished expectation of privacy‖ 
(United States v. Lifshitz 2004, 180).   
 The court then proceeded by nothing that ―the context in which the doctrine of 
‗special needs‘ has been most thoroughly developed is that of drug testing‖ (United 
States v. Lifshitz 2004, 183). The court, therefore, attempted to compare the computer 
monitoring in question to drug testing, noting that ―regular searches of a probationer‘s 
computer, on the one hand, and of his urine or sweat, on the other, can deter him from 
engaging in impermissible conduct‖ (United States v. Lifshitz 2004, 189). It concluded 
then that the ―special needs‖ of the probation system justified the requirement of 
Lifshitz‘s computer monitoring but remanded the case cautioning that the scope of the 
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monitoring may have been too broad. The court elaborated on this point by noting that 
that drug testing is aimed at only determining whether or not an individual has used 
illegal substances and any other type of information gathered from that testing is 
inconsequential.  
 In United States v. Heckenkamp (482 F.3d 1142. 2007) the court once again 
addressed the issue of a ―special needs‖ case. After Scott Kennedy noticed that someone 
had hacked into his company‘s, Qualcomm Corporation, computer network he traced the 
intrusion to a computer on the University of Wisconsin at Madison‘s network. Kennedy 
contacted Jeffrey Savoy, the university‘s network investigator, who then began to 
examine the network for any problems. Savoy confirmed that someone from the 
university‘s network had indeed tried to hack into Qualcomm‘s system as well as the 
university‘s email server. Fearing a massive disruption on campus due to this intrusion, 
Savoy investigated further and managed to trace the intrusion to a computer in one of the 
university‘s dormitories. Savoy determined that the person who had performed the 
intrusion was Jerome Heckenkamp, who he knew had previously worked for the 
university‘s computer help desk before being fired. Savoy also knew that Heckenkamp 
had the technical knowledge that could be used to damage the university‘s system.  
 Savoy contacted FBI agent Terry Rankhorn and informed him about what he had 
found. Rankhorn told Savoy he intended to get a warrant for the computer but he did not 
tell Savoy to investigate further. Savoy was still concerned about the university system‘s 
integrity and continued to monitor the computer‘s activity. Based on what he observed 
Savoy felt that he needed to get the machine offline as soon as possible. Together with 
the university police Savoy went to Heckenkamp‘s room and after he voluntarily gave 
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them his password it was verified that he was the one who hacked the systems. All of this 
took place before the FBI had actually attained a search warrant even though they were 
not directly involved. Heckenkamp argued for suppressing the evidence gathered from 
Savoy monitoring his computer given that he did not have a search warrant. 
 This case is somewhat unique because the court noted in its opinion that ―the 
government [did] not dispute that Heckenkamp had a subjective expectation of privacy in 
his computer and his dormitory room, and there is no doubt that Heckenkamp‘s 
subjective expectation as to the latter was legitimate and objectively reasonable‖ (United 
States v. Heckenkcamp 2007, 1146). Furthermore, citing Lifshitz, the Court also 
recognized that Heckencamp had a ―legitimate, objectively reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his personal computer‖ (United States v. Heckenkcamp 2007, 1146). Given 
these two findings, then, a warrantless search would usually not be considered valid 
under the Fourth Amendment. Yet this case had the complicating factor that the computer 
was connected to a network. Ultimately the court found that under the facts of this 
particular case that ―the act of attaching his computer to the network did not extinguish 
his legitimate, objectively reasonable privacy expectation‖ (United States v. 
Heckenkcamp 2007, 1146). Yet the court cited Angevine when noting that ―privacy 
expectations may be reduced if the user is advised that information transmitted through 
the network is not confidential and that systems administrators may monitor 
communications transmitted by the user‖ (United States v. Heckenkcamp 2007, 1147). In 
this particular case, however, no such warning was given, leading the court to determine 
that Heckenkamp‘s expectation of privacy remained intact, unlike in Angevine and 
Simons.  
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 Even though there was no question as to the legitimacy of the claim of an 
expectation of privacy in Heckenkamp as outlined above, the court nevertheless found the 
warrantless search at issue to be justified. The court found in this case that ―the search of 
the computer was justified under the ‗special needs‘ exception to the warrant 
requirement‖ (United States v. Heckenkcamp 2007, 1147). Whereas the ‗special needs‘ in 
Lifshitz dealt with the search of a parolee, in this case it dealt with a network 
administrator, Savoy, searching Heckenkamp‘s computer in order safeguard the integrity 
and security of the network to which it was connected. The court claimed that ―requiring 
a warrant to investigate potential misuse of the university‘s computer network would 
disrupt the operation of the university and the network that it relies upon in order to 
function‖ (United States v. Heckenkcamp 2007, 1148). Combined with the fact that 
―Savoy was acting purely within the scope of his role as a system administrator‖ acting to 
―rectify an emergency‖ the court found that the ―special needs‖ exception was justified 
(United States v. Heckenkcamp 2007, 1147). The warrantless remote search of his 
computer was then considered valid by the court. This case and the previous case reveal 
some flexibility when applying the Fourth Amendment to the internet given that under 
some circumstances a ―special needs‖ standard may be employed. 
 In United States v. King (509 F.3d 1338, 2007) one of the more fundamental file 
sharing systems scrutinized by the court. While Michael King was working as a civilian 
contractor in Saudi Arabia he lived in a dormitory at the Prince Sultan Air Base. He kept 
his personal laptop in his room, connected to the base‘s network. He was aware that his 
activities while connected to the network were subject to monitoring. King thought that 
he had properly secured his computer so that others were unable to access it. One day an 
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enlisted airman was browsing through the base‘s network, searching for music files, 
when he ran across King‘s computer. Given that King‘s hard drive was a ―shared‖ drive 
the airman was freely able to access it and look at its contents. Along with music files the 
airman also found a pornographic movie as well as pornographic text files on the hard 
drive.  
 The airman reported his findings to a military investigator who then contacted a 
computer specialist. The specialist located and accessed King‘s computer on the network, 
using the same means as the airman, and confirmed the airman‘s findings and also found 
an empty folder on the hard drive labeled ―pedophilia.‖ The specialist then reported her 
findings to the investigator, who proceeded to obtain a search warrant for king‘s room. 
The search of King‘s room yielded cd‘s and hard drives containing thousands of images 
of child pornography. King argued that the search of his computer violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights because it had been conducted without a warrant. 
 The court in this case once again noted that the Fourth Amendment protects 
individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures in those places where they can 
demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy. This is done as was described in Katz 
by demonstrating both an objective and subjective expectation of privacy. With respect to 
a subjective expectation of privacy the court found that given King‘s ―experience with 
computer security and the affirmative steps he took to install security setting‖ that he 
adequately demonstrated his subjective expectation of privacy (United States v. King 
2007, 1341). With respect to the second prong of the test the court found that given that 
King‘s laptop was connected to a military base network then his ―files were ‗shared‘ over 
the entire base network, and that everyone on the network had access to all his files and 
   69 
could observe them in exactly the same manner as the computer specialist did‖ (United 
States v. King 2007, 1342). Therefore ―the content of his computer‘s hard drive were akin 
to items stored in the unsecured common areas of a multi-unit apartment building or put 
in a dumpster accessible to the public‖ (United States v. King 2007, 1342). Given that the 
items in this analogy were previously found not to be worthy of an objective expectation 
of privacy, the court concluded that in this case King also did not hold an objective 
expectation of privacy to the files he had shared through the network. King‘s claim that 
his Fourth Amendment rights were violated was found by the court to be without merit. 
 Yet another workplace example of the Fourth Amendment conflicting with the 
internet is presented in United States v. Barrows (481 F.3d 1246, 2007). Rather than 
involving a work-issued computer, however, it involves one brought from the defendant‘s 
home. Michael Barrows worked as the treasurer of Glencoe, Oklahoma. He did not have 
a private office and instead shared his workspace with the city clerk. This workspace was 
located in an open area of city hall although it was separated from the general public by a 
counter. Barrows and the clerk had little privacy in their workspace given that other 
employees frequently entered the space to use the fax machine and copier located about a 
foot from their desk. The two also shared a computer which they used to access city 
records. Barrows brought his personal computer from home and placed it on their desk.  
He connected the computer to the city‘s network and told his co-worker that they could 
now input and access information simultaneously from either computer.  
 Barrows did not attempt to protect the files on his computer by placing a 
password on it. Furthermore he even left the computer on all the time, even when he was 
away from the desk. Around the time Barrows had connected his computer to the 
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network the clerk started to have problems when trying to access files using the city 
machine. She informed Michael McQuown, a reserve police officer who happened to be 
near the desk at the time, about the problem given that he had helped her with computer 
problems in the past.  
 McQuown attempted to fix the problem for a while and after the clerk informed 
him that Barrows had networked the computer he suspected that the problem they had 
with opening a file may have been due to the file being open on Barrows‘ computer. 
Barrows was not at the desk at the time but the computer was on as usual so McQuown 
used it to try to solve the problem. McQuown quickly noticed that the computer was 
running a file-sharing program so he opened it and looked at the transfer history to 
determine if he had transferred the file they were trying to access. In the transfer history 
he found many files with sexually suggestive names that were revealed to be child 
pornography after he opened a few of them. Afterward McQuown and the sheriff seized 
Barrows‘ computer and obtained a search warrant in order to search the hard drive. 
Barrows argued for the suppression of all the information gathered from his computer 
claiming that the search had violated his Fourth Amendment rights given that the first 
search had been done without a warrant. 
 The court once again made clear that a warrantless search may be unreasonable if 
it occurs even though the defendant held a legitimate expectation of privacy. This 
determination was made by applying the two pronged test outlined in Katz. The 
expectation of privacy was found to be invalid both subjective and objectively. Unlike in 
Slanina, Barrows did not protect his computer with a password, turn it off, or do anything 
else in order to stop a third party from using it. Furthermore the court noted that he was 
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working in a public area where ―the chances a passerby might spy snatches of personal 
material over his shoulder, or sit down to use his computer having honestly mistaken it 
for a city one, were appreciable‖ (United States v. Barrows 2007, 1249). Taking these 
facts into account the court claimed it was ―hard-pressed to conclude that Mr. Barrows 
harbored a subjective expectation of privacy‖ (United States v. Barrows 2007, 1249). 
Barrows further claimed that he did not invite anyone else to use his access his computer, 
yet similarly as in King, the court found that ―he knowingly networked his machine to the 
city computer for the express purpose of sharing files‖  (United States v. Barrows 2007, 
1249). Given that Barrows made no reasonable attempts at blocking his personal 
information from being viewed from third parties the court found he held no objective 
expectation of privacy either. Having failed both portions of the Katz test the court found 
that Barrows did not hold a legitimate expectation of privacy so the warrantless search 
did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. 
 In United States v. Perrine (518 F.3d 1196, 2008) involves internet chat rooms, 
peer-to-peer file sharing software, and also hints at the distinction between content and 
non-content information that will be expanded upon later. James Vanlandingham from 
Pennsylvania was in a Yahoo! Chat room when he began chatting with a person whose 
screen name was ―stevedragonslayer.‖ This user invited Vanlandingham to watch a web 
cam video that featured two nude girls. Vanlandingham contacted the local police after he 
had been shown the video but continued the chat with stevedragonslayer. Before the 
police arrived at Vanlandingham‘s house stevedragonslayer showed him more videos 
depicting you girls performing explicit sexual acts. The chat had ceased by the time 
police arrived but Vanlandingham had saved the chat conversation.  
   72 
 Based on Valaningham‘s information the police obtained the subscriber 
information for the chat user stevedragonslayer from Yahoo! who was able to provide 
them with his IP address. After they got the IP the police identified that it was maintained 
by Cox Communications, Inc. The police sought the subscriber information for the 
person tied to the IP from Cox and were given information regarding 
stevendragonslayer‘s true identity. The user stevedragonslayer was actually Steve Perrine 
from Wichita, Kansas. The Pennsylvania police contacted the Kansas authorities who 
were able to obtain a search warrant for Perrine‘s house. The police found thousands of 
child pornography images on Perrine‘s computer and also noted that Perrine had installed 
Kazaa, a peer-to-peer file sharing program, on his computer. One of Perrine‘s arguments 
was that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the police obtained his 
subscriber information from Yahoo! and Cox. 
 In this case the court pointed to several other cases such as Hambrick, Guest, and 
Lifshitz among other lower court decisions to support its finding that the information one 
gives to an internet service provider cannot be said to be protected by the Fourth 
Amendment. The court also noted that Perrine installed peer-to-peer software on his 
computer ―which permitted anyone else on the internet to access at least certain folders in 
his computer‖ and concluded that this action ―additionally vitiates any expectations of 
privacy he might have [had] in his computer and its content‖ (United States v. Perrine 
2008, 1205). The court concluded therefore that Perrine had no privacy expectation with 
neither his subscriber information nor with the content on his computer. 
 The case of United States v. Forrester (512 F.3d 500, 2008) is perhaps the one 
examined here that most closely resembles one of the pre-internet cases so the manner in 
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which the court treated it may prove to be particularly interesting. Mark Forrester and 
Dennis Alba were being investigated over a suspected Ecstasy manufacturing operation. 
During its investigation the government used a ―mirror port‖ to monitor Alba‘s email and 
internet activity. The mirror port is analogous to a pen register and kept track of the 
to/from addresses of any emails sent, the IP addresses of websites visited, as well as the 
amount of information sent or received by the account. The use of this device was 
challenged by Alba given that it monitored his activity without the need of a warrant. 
 As it may have been expected in this case‘s reasoning the court drew upon the 
reasoning used in Smith v. Maryland greatly given that it considered the questions at 
issue to be quite analogous. The court first reasoned that ―e-mail and Internet users, like 
the telephone users in Smith, rely on third-party equipment in order to engage in 
communication‖ (United States v. Forrester 2008, 510). Where telephone users require 
intervention from the phone company to communicate, internet users require an internet 
service provider to communicate. So, similarly to Smith, the court claimed that  
E-mail and Internet users have no expectation of privacy in the to/from 
addresses of their messages or the IP addresses of the websites they visit 
because they should know that this information is provided to and used by 
Internet service providers for the specific purpose of directing the routing 
information. (United States v. Forrester 2008, 510)  
The court further reasoned that ―the government‘s surveillance of e-mail addresses also 
may be technologically sophisticated, but it is conceptually indistinguishable from 
government surveillance of physical mail‖ (United States v. Forrester 2008, 511). Since 
the case only involved the government obtaining the ―the to/from addresses of a person‘s 
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e-mails or the IP addresses of websites visited‖ and did not gather anything regarding the 
content of these addresses, the information gathered was no more intrusive than 
examining the outside of a piece of mail (United States v. Forrester 2008, 510). The court 
argued that while they knew the IP addresses of the websites visited they could not tell 
which particular pages on that website were viewed. The court once again compared this 
observation to a less technologically advanced one noting that ―like IP addresses, certain 
phone numbers may strongly indicate the underlying content of the communication; for 
example, the government would know that a person who dialed the phone number of a 
chemicals company or a gun shop was likely seeking information about chemicals or 
firearms‖ (United States v. Forrester 2008, 510). Therefore in this instance, as in Smith, 
there was no Fourth Amendment violation since the court found in this case that the use 
of the mirror port did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. 
 While the use of a peer-to-peer program to share files was mentioned in passing in 
Perrine, such a program played a larger role in United States v. Ganoe (538 F.3d 1117, 
2008). Special Agent for Immigration and Customs Enforcement Ken Rochford was 
trying to locate people trading child pornography online via the peer-to-peer file sharing 
program LimeWire. Rochford found a video he suspected of being child pornography 
which he confirmed after downloading and viewing it. Through LimeWire Rochford was 
able the view rest of the files being shared by the person that hosted the video. His 
inspection revealed more files containing similar content. Rochford was able to determine 
the host computer‘s IP address and that led to him finding out that the IP address 
belonged to Tyrone Ganoe. Rochford also obtained Ganoe‘s physical address as well as a 
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search warrant for his house. Ganoe argued the initial search of his computer without a 
warrant violated his Fourth Amendment rights. 
 The court reiterated that a person generally has an objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy with respect to their personal computer but this expectation is 
altered when one installs file sharing software on their computer. The court found that the 
claim of an expectation of privacy cannot survive the ―decision to install and use file-
sharing software, thereby opening [one‘s] computer to anyone else with the same freely 
available program‖ (United States v. Ganoe 2008, 1127). Even though Ganoe claimed he 
did not know others would be able to remotely access the files stored on his computer 
when installing the software the court rebutted that claim by pointing out that ―he was 
explicitly warned before completing the installation that the folder into which files are 
downloaded would be shared with other users in the peer-to-peer network‖ (United States 
v. Ganoe 2008, 1127). Taking these facts into account the court found that Ganoe could 
not adequately demonstrate an expectation of privacy that society would consider 
reasonable so he could therefore not invoke Fourth Amendment protection. 
 The case of United States v. Stults (575 F.3d 834, 2009) also focused on the issue 
of file-sharing. FBI agent Joseph Cecchini used LimeWire to search for potential hosts of 
child pornography. He encountered one user with various files depicting child 
pornography. Cecchini obtained the IP address of the user using LimeWire and then 
attained a subpoena to get the ISP, Cox Communications, to hand over the subscriber 
information based on the IP address. The user hosting the child pornography was 
identified as Harold Stults. A warrant was obtained for Stults‘ house that when executed 
yielded more instances of child pornography on Stults‘ computer. Stults argued that the 
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warrant was obtained based on evidence gathered from an illegal search of his computer 
through peer-to-peer file sharing software. 
 Once again the court wished to determine whether Stults held a legitimate 
expectation of privacy with may have invalidated the warrantless search conducted on his 
computer. The key question to determine this as phrased by the court was then ―whether 
Stults had both a subjective and objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in files 
accessed through Stults‘s installation and use of LimeWire, P2P file-sharing software‖ 
(United States v. Stults 2009, 842). The court cited cases such as Ganoe, Perrine, and 
Barrows to solidify the point that when one allows access to the content of their computer 
either via the installation of file-sharing programs, as in Ganoe and Perrine, or through 
connecting to a network, as in Barrows, while they may have had a legitimate expectation 
of privacy before, that expectation is removed. The installation of the file-sharing 
software therefore removed any objective expectation of privacy Stults may have had 
otherwise. Therefore Stults was not found to have met the requirement to invoke Fourth 
Amendment protection. 
 One of the most recent internet related Fourth Amendment cases that has also 
received a fair amount of attention is United States v. Warshak (631 F.3d 266, 2010). 
Steven Warshak was the owner of a business that came under the scrutiny of the Better 
Business Bureau. Many customers had complained about the company‘s auto-ship 
program that would continue to charge and send them products unless they opted out, 
though they had never been told they had to. Warshak had also been under investigation 
for other reasons. Warshak‘s company relied heavily on email communication between 
its employees. One of his email accounts was provided by the ISP NuVox 
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Communications. During their investigation the government requested that NuVox 
preserve the contents of any emails Warshak sent or received. Warshak was not informed 
that his emails were being preserved. The government did not review the emails until 
later when it had obtained a subpoena to do so. Warshak was also not aware of this 
subpoena. Warshak argued that the seizure of these roughly 27,000 emails violated his 
Fourth Amendment rights given many of the emails were gathered before a warrant was 
obtained. 
 As is made evident by the outlines of the cases chosen above, the types of 
situations in which the Fourth Amendment comes into conflict with the internet are 
manifested in many ways. The diversity between these cases is beneficial for the 
purposes of this work because it can speak to the efficacy of past principles if they are 
found to be applied consistently in these varying scenarios. Furthermore when looking at 
both the internet related cases and those involving past technologies it is evident that 
while most of the cases are incomparable in terms of the types of actions that took place 
there are also some that can be seen as analogous, such as Smith and Forrester. Once 
again this variance can potentially highlight any differences or similarities used between 
the reasoning in the cases. 
 The court once again applied the subjective and objective expectation of privacy 
test when considering whether Warshak had a valid Fourth Amendment claim in this 
instance. The reason this case was more high profile than other internet related cases is 
because it involved the access to the content of emails rather than just their non-content 
information. With respect to the subjective portion of the test the court found that 
―Warshak plainly manifested an expectation that his email would be shielded from 
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outside scrutiny‖ (United States v. Warshak 2010, 284). They based this on the 
substantive information contained in the emails, highly doubting that it was the kind of 
information someone would want to present to the public.  
 As a preface to addressing the objective expectation of privacy with respect to 
email content the court made explicit the fact that email has become a very common tool 
individuals use in today‘s society and that through email people transmit countless 
amounts of sensitive information. Given this high degree of importance email has 
achieved in many people‘s lives the court stated that much hinges ―on whether the 
government is permitted to request that a commercial ISP turn over the contents of a 
subscriber‘s emails without triggering the machinery of the Fourth Amendment‖ (United 
States v. Warshak 2010, 284). The court compared email to telephone conversations as 
well as conventional mail, citing Katz as well as Ex Parte Jackson, to make the point that 
the content of the types of communication these cases address cannot be examined 
without police first obtaining a warrant after demonstrating probable cause. Therefore the 
court concluded that ―given the fundamental similarities between email and traditional 
forms of communication, it would defy common sense to afford email lesser Fourth 
Amendment protection‖ (United States v. Warshak 2010, 285-286). Given that the court 
considered email to be analogous to a phone call or a letter it then compared the ISP to a 
post office or telephone company. It follows from this reasoning that the police would not 
be able to compel an ISP from handing over the content information from emails since 
―the police may not storm the post office and intercept a letter, and they are likewise 
forbidden from using the phone system to make a clandestine recording of a telephone 
call—unless they get a warrant, that is‖ (United States v. Warshak 2010, 286). 
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 The court also took into consideration the subscription agreement that Warshak 
had agreed to when signing up with his ISP that stated that it ―may access and use 
individual Subscriber information in the operation of the Service and as necessary to 
protect the Service‘‖ (United States v. Warshak 2010, 287). Yet the court was ―convinced 
that some degree of routine access is hardly dispositive with respect to the privacy 
question‖ (United States v. Warshak 2010, 287). It did recognize that there may be some 
agreements, however, where if an ISP warns of frequent monitoring of emails then that 
would make an expectation of privacy unreasonable. Taking all these factors into account 
the court decided that in cases such as the one presented ―the government may not 
compel a commercial ISP to turn over the contents of a subscriber‘s emails without first 
obtaining a warrant based on probable cause‖ (United States v. Warshak 2010, 288). The 
court then concluded that government agents violated the Fourth Amendment when they 
obtained the contents of Warshak‘s emails without a warrant. The court went even further 
in this case and addressed the Stored Communications Act (SCA) which is a ―statute that 
allows the government to obtain certain electronic communications without procuring a 
warrant‖ (United States v. Warshak 2010, 282). The court found that this portion of the 
statute, for the reasons noted above, to be unconstitutional.  
 There are a few trends that one can gather from examining the reasoning behind 
the cases highlighted above. Perhaps the most obvious common reasoning tactic used 
throughout these cases was the application of the reasonable expectation of privacy test. 
The pervasiveness of this test is evident given that it was used in all cases, even those 
concerning widely different types of technological innovations. With respect to the 
question at issue here the constant application of this approach can lend some insight as 
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to the relationship between the law and the internet. At the very least what this has 
demonstrated is that the internet may not be an innovation so new and revolutionary that 
previously established principles are not well-suited enough to deal with the legal 
problems that arise in it. 
 A second trend that is observed from examining the cases above is the willingness 
of courts to apply analogies when faced with novel technologies. When faced with a 
situation that may not have been directly addressed before courts looked for analogues of 
the situation in more familiar contexts. Thermal imagers were likened to drug sniffing 
dogs, email was compared to conventional mail, files stored in a shared folder were seen 
as analogous to items placed in a communal area, and more.  
 The perseverance of the third party doctrine can also be seen throughout the cases 
examined above. From Smith in 1979 to Warshak in 2010 and in many cases in between 
the courts frequently considered whether information that one transmits is likely to wind 
up in the hands of a third party and if it does then one‘s expectation of privacy with 
respect to that information or at least some aspect of it may fall.  
 There is also evidence of flexibility in the way in which the courts approach 
Fourth Amendment issues with respect to the internet. The cases of Heckenkamp and 
Lifshitz for instance demonstrate that courts can utilize exceptions, such as the ―special 
needs‖ exception, in order to more adequately respond to particular issues raised by 
certain cases. Even in these cases, however, the use of the ―special needs‖ exception was 
grounded in more familiar situations via the use of analogies. 
 One particular trend that is seen only in the internet-related cases above is the idea 
of one‘s expectation of privacy while online being diminished, even in one‘s home, by 
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some kind of disclaimer. For instance, in work environments company policies were 
considered enough to make warrantless searches valid. This finding may not seem very 
surprising in the context of the workplace but what may be more surprising, however, is 
that when at home one‘s expectation of privacy may be eroded as well. For example by 
installing some particular software, as the peer-to-peer file sharing cases demonstrated, or 
due to some contract with one‘s ISP, as the court in Warshak implied others may then be 
able to examine the content of your computer. 
 One trend that is also significant for the purpose of this work is the noted absence 
of innovation. This does not refer to technological innovation, which was obviously not 
lacking, but rather an absence in innovation in reasoning when addressing these issues. It 
should be noted that this case study was quite narrow in the much larger realm of conflict 
between the law and the internet, but nevertheless throughout the decades that the survey 
spanned courts did not have to create wholly new principles or techniques in order to deal 
with the issues when it came to the conflicts involving the internet and the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 Ultimately then, insofar as the small scope taken here can speak to, these cases 
have demonstrated that the internet is not necessarily the paradigm shattering innovation 
that some may fear it is. It is not an entity unable to be regulated, a veritable ―no man‘s 
land,‖ on the contrary as these cases have demonstrated, decades old techniques are still 
readily amenable to this new frontier, at least to an extent. 
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Chapter 4: Discussion and Conclusion 
 Having presented the findings after analyzing several cases involving technology 
and the internet the question of how the law, at least with respect to the Fourth 
Amendment, and the internet interact can now be addressed. As the problem was initially 
framed in the context of the debate between those who feel the internet can be readily 
regulated against those who do not it makes sense to frame the findings and conclusions 
within this context as well. After discussing the findings in this manner it is apt to 
critically reflect on the actual approach that was taken. Tied closely to this retrospective 
view of the process is a consideration of the applicability and generalizability of the 
results. 
 It is fairly evident that with respect to the debate concerning the ―regulability,‖ as 
Lessig (1999) describes it, of cyberspace that the internet is indeed capable of being 
regulated at least to a degree. The internet has undoubtedly become intertwined with 
many aspects of everyday life for most individuals yet the fear that some may have had of 
cyperspace being a sort of ―no man‘s land‖ with respect to the law is overblown. Looking 
at the manner in which courts apply the laws should have indicated that this perhaps 
never was going to be the case.  
 The courts‘ reactions to previous technological innovations demonstrates that 
through analogies and consistent application of legal principles they are able to ground 
their reasoning when dealing with new technologies to past, better understood and more 
concretely grounded with respect to the law, phenomena. The cases examined here 
displayed time and again that the Katz rationale persists throughout wildly varying 
technological changes. Skeptics should have foreseen that this approach is applicable 
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with respect to the internet even though it may have created tenuous bonds at best in their 
eyes. What further emphasizes the robust nature of the Katz reasoning is that even when 
looking at the internet alone, which was shown to present many potential scenarios 
pertaining to the application of the Fourth Amendment, it was nevertheless applied 
consistently. There are others, however, that accept that the law and the internet can 
function together yet question the efficacy of this relationship. The concerns of these 
scholars could raise doubts with respect to the continued application of the Katz rationale. 
Simply because it has been applied consistently so far does not imply that this will 
continue to be the case. 
 The opposite end of the debate about the internet‘s regulability is harder to 
determine. Within this school of thought are those who think that the internet does not 
pose an impediment when it comes to applying the law. As the findings here demonstrate 
this point of view appears to more accurately represent how the law, with respect to the 
Fourth Amendment, and the internet actually interact. The third party principle, the Katz 
test, special needs exceptions, and other principles are all found to be readily applied to 
cases involving the internet. As was mentioned above, what is more debatable, however, 
is the underlying effectiveness of applying the law to the internet. This is the debate that 
has implications on whether the Katz rationale can continue to endure. If the Katz 
reasoning continues to be applied in the face of even newer innovations yet it cannot be 
said to serve the same fundamental purpose this may perhaps indicate the need to find a 
new approach. Fortunately as the cases here have demonstrated, however, this is not yet 
the case.  
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 It is one thing to be able to apply old principles online but it is another for these 
principles to have the same effect online as they do in the physical world. For instance is 
the expectation of privacy one has online as readily discernable as in the physical world? 
The internet is still a relatively new innovation meaning that many individuals may still 
be ignorant when it comes to what repercussions their actions may have online. The 
implications of the answer to this question are further compounded by the pace of 
technological growth, which is increasingly uniting the online and offline worlds. So can 
the law possibly adapt at the rate necessary to stay relevant alongside the rapidly 
changing cyberworld? This secondary debate will be addressed shortly.  
 Looking at the cases examined as a whole it is evident that insofar as the Katz test 
was applied it was done so consistently throughout, with the exception of Kyllo v. United 
States. Yet Kyllo was important to consider given that its ruling went contrary to cases 
such as United States v. Pinson and United States v. Ford, both of which dealt with the 
same technological innovation and actually employed the Katz rationale. The Kyllo Court 
ultimately, however, did not arrive at its differing outcome due to a different application 
or replacement of the Katz reasoning. Rather it did so by placing a large premium on the 
privacy one has in their home while simultaneously attempting to curb the ability certain 
technologies may have in shrinking the sphere of privacy.  
 One may ask how an intrusion into the privacy of the home can be invalidated in 
Kyllo yet it was not found to be a problem in cases such as United States v. Ganoe or 
United States v. Stults. In each of these cases warrantless searches were conducted on the 
defendants, more specifically on their personal computers located within their own 
homes, yet the searches were found to not have violated their Fourth Amendment rights. 
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The Kyllo Court appeared to warn about this kind of intrusion. In actuality, however, the 
Kyllo Court forbade such searches when they involved the use of technology by the 
government that was not in general public use. Obviously then, both the internet as well 
as the file sharing software that opened these monitoring avenues in the first place against 
the defendants in Ganoe  and Stults were both in general public use. Therefore though 
Kyllo may at first blush be seen as an outlier in the sample set not only does its reasoning 
not conflict with the later cases but it may assuage the doubts of those that wonder why 
the home is not as impregnable as one would expect when it comes to the internet. 
 Overall, Kyllo aside, it is fairly evident that the cases examined here were treated 
consistently; there were no obvious instances of encountering a situation so novel that a 
new principle was needed. On the contrary some cases could even be seen to parallel 
each other between the physical and cyber worlds. Smith v. Maryland for instance is very 
similar to United States v. Forrester and the situation in United States v. Katz could be 
seen as comparable to that of United States v. Warshak at least when examining the 
issues that are functionally at stake. The ability to apply the Katz rationale in such 
functionally different scenarios also supports its continued application in the face of even 
newer technologies given that they may be ultimately rooted in more manageable terms. 
Yet taking these findings and claiming that one can conclude that the internet is truly 
nothing new would be a simplistic claim. It is indeed evident that old laws can be applied 
to the internet in an apparently easy manner but as many scholars have noted the more 
pertinent question may be whether doing so is truly effective and the optimum solution 
for handling the law on the internet. As was noted earlier in this work, Kerr (2010) 
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addressed both these issues and asked whether the previously established legal rules still 
fulfill their intended function in the new technological realm.  
 In order to stay true to the spirit of the old laws, Kerr posits that an overt link 
should be made between the physical and online worlds that more clearly informs courts 
with how to handle certain issues that arise online. The findings presented here may 
question the necessity of explicitly adopting the kind of connections that Kerr proposes 
such as equating certain kinds of physical surveillance to the monitoring of content and 
non-content information online. As United States v. Warshak, United States v. Hambrick, 
and Guest v. Leis have demonstrated courts have already taken into account the 
distinction between content and non-content information online without the need of 
external guidelines informing them on how to do so. Yet this does not necessarily mean 
that Kerr‘s claims are wholly without merit. On the contrary, such an overt distinction 
between the types of content may become more import as technology advances, as will 
be discussed later. 
 Another issue some scholars such as Tyson (2010) and Grubins (2008) point out 
with regards to the efficacy of the courts in dealing with the problems that may be raised 
with respect to the law and the internet revolves around which approach should be taken 
to address these issues: a judicial one, a statutory one, or a mixture of both. Individuals 
on both sides of this argument often point to the inadequacies the other may face when 
dealing with the problem. The claim most often levied against the courts is that they are 
too slow to react to the quickly changing technologies. While it is true that technology 
seems to be accelerating at break-neck speeds the ability of the courts to nevertheless 
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apply past principles as has been demonstrated here reveals that they too are able to 
adapt.  
 Further evidence of the adaptability of the courts is seen in the cases presented 
here involving the use of thermal imagers. Whereas courts initially interpreted the 
relationship with these devices in one manner eventually these interpretations were 
overturned by one that placed a greater premium on privacy. Such an interpretation may 
even be claimed to better embody the true spirit of the Fourth Amendment. What this set 
of cases further demonstrates, however, is that experiencing growing pains when it comes 
to technology is not a situation unique to the law‘s relationship with the internet.  
 Insofar as this work can speak to the relationship between statutory and judicial 
solutions to problems that may arise between the law and the internet there is already 
evidence of the fundamental role these two bodies play. As Warshak illustrates with 
respect to the Stored Communications Act (SCA), by claiming the portion of the statute 
granting police officers the power to request content information from ISP‘s to be 
unconstitutional, the courts play a vital role if the legislature becomes too overzealous in 
its attempts to adapt to new technologies. In this sense then it would appear that neither 
of these two bodies can deal with the changing technology alone, yet a more optimum 
balance may be created through give and take. 
 Given the reactive nature that the legislature and judicial branches are destined to 
have with respect to technology there is always bound to be some degree of lag between 
the emergence of a new or adapted technology and a governmental reaction to best apply 
the law to it. In this sense then the scholars critiquing these institutions are correct to a 
degree. Recent technological innovations have emphasized the importance of creating a 
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sound relationship between the law and the internet because this relationship is not as 
static as that between the law and previous technological innovations. Aerial surveillance 
is unlikely to yield any different results than the ones in California v. Ciraolo and as 
Kyllo made clear even very sophisticated thermal imagers will be judged in the same 
manner that older models are at least with respect to their warrantless use, unless they 
become mainstream devices. But the internet itself changes. It gains more functions and 
expands its reach in the lives of most individuals. Social networking once relegated to 
designated internet chat rooms can now be manifested in countless ways and not just 
from a computer but from a smartphone or a tablet. While phones have gained many of 
the functions of computers the opposite has also occurred with the advent of Voice over 
Internet Protocol (VoIP) technologies such as Skype allowing people‘s computers to 
function as telephones but using their internet connections rather than the telephone lines. 
Also gaining momentum is the idea of cloud computing wherein individuals are able to 
store a wide array of information from practically any device with an internet connection 
onto a remote server rather than on their own device. The concerns of those who fear the 
law may move too slowly for its own good become much more significant when one 
takes into account all of these and other recent technological innovations. 
 Is the law‘s current pace sufficient in order to deal with the burst of innovations 
listed above? There is no dearth of potential problems that may arise between the law and 
these new developments in cyberspace. Taking VoIP as an example, one solution the 
court may have for this technology may not be sufficient given that different pieces of 
software inherently function differently. Whereas most VoIP programs function using a 
client-peer model, comparable to that used by email servers, Skype functions using a 
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peer-to-peer model like various file sharing programs. Without getting too bogged down 
in the technical details of each it may be sufficient to observe how the courts have treated 
these models in the past.  
 On the one hand, in cases such as Ganoe, Stults, and United States v. Perrine 
peer-to-peer software has been found to essentially remove an individual‘s expectation of 
privacy to a large extent given that it allows others with the same software to access 
certain portions of one‘s computer.  Courts have argued that installing such software 
amounts to disclosing such materials to a third party. One may then ask whether this 
interpretation of the fundamental model on which a certain program operates extends 
across other types of programs in which it is implemented. Alternately it was the client-
server model that was in question in cases such as United States v. Forrester and 
Warshak. In these cases the court granted more protection to the material the defendants 
disclosed. Unlike in the peer-to-peer cases where content information was deemed fine to 
examine without a search warrant in the client-server cases the courts drew the line at 
gathering non-content information. In these cases, for instance, warrantless searches that 
merely gathered information regarding where emails were being sent to or where they 
were coming from were considered valid. To have gathered the content of the emails, 
however, would have been unconstitutional. Would the validity of a VoIP equivalent of a 
wiretap rely more on the manner in which peer-to-peer programs were previously judged 
or would they rely more on the overall function of the program, in this case as a 
telephone analogue.  
 The kind of situation outlined above is the type Kerr (2003) points to when he 
describes the importance of the perspective the law can potentially take when 
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encountering the internet. The external perspective would focus more on the model used 
while the internal perspective would essentially see a phone call. So one might then ask 
whether a warrantless search would be valid if someone were using a certain version of 
VoIP software as opposed to another. Would someone using Skype have the same 
decreased expectation of privacy as those who use peer-to-peer file sharing software? 
Would the content of their conversations be protected from a warrantless search or would 
it be admissible in court much like the content information gathered from file sharing 
software was? These kinds of questions are harder to answer and highlight the difficulties 
scholars have expressed the law may face with respect to the internet. These questions 
also highlight the potential benefit of explicitly classifying certain actions online as being 
worthy of a certain degree of protection based solely on how it compares to the physical 
world rather than how it functions mechanically as Kerr has posited.  
 Cloud computing though still in its infancy also has the potential to pose difficult 
questions. As cases such as United States v. Simons and United States v. Angevine 
demonstrated, company policies may reduce one‘s expectation of privacy when it comes 
to one‘s work. With people being able to access and store information on the cloud from 
work, home, an airport, or anywhere else, the expectation of privacy one has with respect 
to what they store on the cloud may pose some problems. Would the expectation of 
privacy remain the same to all the information one uploads to the cloud or could it 
perhaps shift depending on where the person was when they uploaded it? Can the Katz 
rationale survive even when the metrics upon which it is based become so mercurial to 
the point that they can no longer be gauged consistently?  Perhaps the most pressing 
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technological innovation that needs to be addressed by the courts, however, relates to 
how to treat smartphones. 
 Orso (2010) and Engel (2010) have both considered the issues raised by 
smartphones with respect to the law. Whereas the Fourth Amendment cases surveyed 
here did not include questioning the search of a computer incident to arrest, such a search 
could now be said to be possible with the advent of smartphones, which can perform 
many of the same tasks as computers and can hold a large extent of private information. 
With smartphones it may be possible that an individual being searched incident to arrest 
receives a text message, an email, or has incriminating photos stored on their phone. 
Under such a scenario the question may be raised as to whether, similarly to United 
States v. Meriwether, the court may find that one sending a text message, an email, or a 
picture cannot be sure that the intended recipient will be the one that receives the 
message. Combined with the ability of files stored on the cloud to be accessed from smart 
phones and the importance of the degree to which the police can search a smartphone 
incident to arrest without a warrant is further magnified. Something upload from the 
privacy of one‘s home could then be indistinguishable in the eyes of the police from 
something uploaded from the office. 
 The Katz reasoning has indeed held fast against the different technological 
innovations it has faced so far yet, as the cases examined here have shown, its application 
involved cases where subjective and objective expectations of privacy were arguably 
easy to determine, either a defendant was at home or at work or they had waived some 
degree of privacy through installing some software or agreeing to some policy. When the 
border between home and work is blurred, however, as cloud computing combined with 
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mobile devices can do, which is further exacerbated with software whose privacy 
expectations remain ambiguous, the question of subjective and objective expectations of 
privacy become harder to determine, which directly undermines the applicability of the 
Katz rationale.  
 As the various new technologies are making clear the physical world and cyber 
world are becoming ever more interconnected. This increasing interconnectedness raises 
yet another problem about the efficacy of applying the law to the internet. Leary (2011) 
and Plourde-Cole (2010) both touched upon the issue that this melding of the two worlds 
may present. As the findings here have shown, courts have readily applied the Katz test to 
various internet related issues. The courts evaluated individuals‘ subjective and objective 
expectations of privacy yet how accurate can these judgments be?  
 The internet by its very nature is relatively new and there are undoubtedly many 
individuals that are ignorant as to the way in which it functions. Undoubtedly many 
people are not wholly aware of the difference between the peer-to-peer or client-server 
models. Surely there are some individuals who are genuinely unaware that through the 
installation of certain file-sharing programs they may be opening their computers to 
outsiders. Furthermore, as Leary points out, younger generations may have a wholly 
different view when it comes to an expectation of privacy than the older generation. What 
to the younger generation may seem more acceptable to do online would perhaps be 
eschewed by older generations. Both prongs of the Katz test may then be applied unfairly 
to someone who either has had little experience with the internet or who has grown up in 
a separate environment with the internet. If the rationale is then being applied unfairly is 
it worth it to keep applying it? 
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 Illegally downloading music may be the norm for a large portion of the younger 
generation. They may feel perfectly safe doing so from the comfort of their homes while 
another large portion would refrain from such an activity since they more accurately 
understand the potential consequences of such behavior. Yet when asking whether 
society would find one to have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy when 
downloading illegal music from one‘s home using a peer-to-peer program, those who do 
not know how such programs function may answer yes, while the court has consistently 
found that one does not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy when using 
such programs. This is perhaps the most difficult problem to answer when considering 
the efficacy of applying the law to the internet given that it is very hard to gauge what is 
truly objectively reasonable to society. This type of problem is further highlighted when 
it comes to the newer technologies such as VoIP and cloud computing. Many people may 
be willing to readily use such innovations yet it is unlikely that many will actively seek to 
learn how they actually function.  
 How is it possible then for a court to posit a credible objective expectation of 
privacy to such novel technologies? Yet it must be noted that this fault of the Katz test is 
not unique to the internet. With any technological innovation the court has had to guess to 
a large extent as to what society may or may not find reasonable. Nevertheless this line of 
reason may then seem to be the one that most puts the continued application of the Katz 
rationale into question. As the prongs of the Katz test become more difficult to determine 
concretely due to the unfamiliarity large portions of society may have with them, it may 
become harder for courts to claim to be able to accurately and justly continue applying 
the test. Yes the Katz rational has been consistently applied since it was first used in 1967 
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but that does not mean it will continue to be applied. Just as Katz overruled Olmstead v. 
United States it may itself be overruled by some rationale that more accurately fulfills the 
Fourth Amendment‘s purpose in the age of the internet. It is perhaps the types of 
hypothetical situations presented above that may eventually lead to a new method of 
interpreting the Fourth Amendment with respect to the internet.  
 Looking at the results of this inquiry may not seem all too surprising. Having 
been living in a world where the internet is commonplace for over a decade now it may 
seem like just another tool we use to make life more convenient, although it is a tool that 
is constantly getting better. Yet the internet has truly changed the face of the world and it 
is no wonder that many individuals were greatly concerned with how the law would 
interact with such an unknown entity that learns and grows. The fact that it is still 
learning and grown, however, reveals the importance of more concretely understanding 
the relationship between the law and the internet.  
 The findings presented here have been concerned with but a small portion of the 
much larger relationship between the law and the internet. Through this narrow focus a 
true consistency in approach among the courts was able to be more readily identified. 
While this approach grants greater insight into a small portion of this relationship, its 
generalizability with respect to the law in general may be harder to accomplish. It is here 
where other works can be used to supplement the findings presented in this case. For 
instance how the First Amendment or copyright law interact with the internet, among 
many other examples, are other areas of potential research that can grant a better 
understanding of the relationship as a whole. 
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 With respect to the methodological approach taken here one benefit is that what is 
presented is a first-hand mapping of the reasoning courts have taken with respect to the 
scope studied. Obviously, however, this was not an exhaustive presentation of all the 
relevant cases on the subject, but this flaw can be easily remedied by merely increasing 
the sample size. The cases presented were rather varied, however, and still managed to 
demonstrate some consistency with respect to the reasoning strategies employed even 
across appellate circuits. Unfortunately the sample did not include Supreme Court cases 
involving the internet but that is perhaps to be expected given that not many such cases 
are likely to have reached such a level of deliberation. Another detriment of the approach 
undertaken here is that it does not take into account statutory attempts at reconciling the 
issues that may arise between the Fourth Amendment and the internet. Yet, as Warshak 
made evident, given that at issue is a constitutional question the courts‘ decisions can 
ultimately trump potentially troublesome statutes.  
 Ultimately the findings here have demonstrated several things. Primarily with 
respect to the regulability of the internet, the old principles are indeed applicable. The 
continued application of these principles is ultimately uncertain, however. As various 
authors above have noted, and the results here have shown, while there has been a 
consistency in the application of the Katz rationale this does not mean that there are 
problems with the way in which it is actually applied. Yet the work presented here if 
anything highlights how robust the legal system is given that it can be seen to steadily 
trudge along as the technological world runs circles around it. But it would appear that 
rather than being completely left in the dust by technology that the relationship between 
the law and technology is more like that of the tortoise and the hare. With its tried and 
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true principles the law can react and adapt to the world around it. By its nature the law 
will always lag behind but that does not mean it will become obsolete. Even in the 
rapidly evolving technological world courts can find links with the old to make some 
sense of the new. Yet the fact that the Katz rationale has survived its initial encounters 
with the internet does not mean that it will continue to do so. 
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